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ABSTRACT 
This project seeks to demonstrate human value beyond the modern will in the 
form of an Ur-will, a residue of the will that cannot be attributed to the historic age. By 
utilizing the seemingly diverse ideas of Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, an attentive 
releasement towards death, and Kant’s Lebensgefühl, a feeling of life engendered by 
aesthetic and reflective experience, this work shows how a more primordial relation to 
both the sensible and the supersensible reveals an underlying harmony between 
humanity and nature. This harmony opens the space for a dual reorientation, between 
humanity and the thing, and between humanity and our rational ideas that allows for 
both Gelassenheit and the ability to reflect on nature in terms of human value. 
Establishing the Ur-will as an indeterminate tie between the embodied, and sensuous, 
human and supersensible ideas provides the basis for the possibility of human value 
existing beyond the modern age and into the ‘new beginning’ prescribed by Heidegger 
through Gelassenheit. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Western thought has accustomed us to think that there is a distance between 
ourselves as individual subjects and the totality of everything else beyond the perimeter 
of our ego. Whether the boundary stones are placed at the edge of consciousness or are 
set farther to include corporeal matter into our sense of individuality, a sense of 
separation persists between what we call ‘self’ and ‘others.’ This is what is known as the 
subject/object orientation, with the individual human standing as a subject over and 
against which sits an objective world. Arising from this orientation comes the inevitable 
claim that I, myself, am a subject and everything beyond that boundary is an object that I 
must view as external and ultimately alien to my being. All phenomena, that which 
appears, must then be approached, questioned, and challenged by my subjective eye 
should I wish to determine any meaning or value about the external world. All values 
then become a result of my reaching out to what appears, since it is the only way I, as an 
individual distinct from the world around me, can interact with phenomena. However, a 
certain doubt stirs within the subject’s mind after a number of such interactions. Does 
the meaning gleaned from objective challenging point to something essential about the 
thing we encounter, or is meaning simply a result of our questioning and have little in 
terms of actual resemblance to the phenomena?  
A startling question indeed, and one that begs to be answered, for it is the root of 
all human knowledge and things we hold as true. What then comes into consideration is 
the existence of two kinds of laws. There are laws that we claim are derived empirically 
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from nature that have nothing to do with our own interest – natural laws. Second, there 
are laws that are motivated by our human interests, ideas of how we, as humans, would 
like the world to be. Thus, the final act of severance between what there is and what 
there ought to be, with nature on one side and humanity on the other. Humanity has now 
become alienated from nature, the world around us, because what we value and desire is 
contentious with the very idea that nature has meaning that it can show itself. Such a 
fierce divide was brought about by the initial assumption that I, the human subject, am 
irredeemably distinct from the world around me. Though this idea is deeply rooted in not 
only western philosophy, but also forms the foundation for nearly all modern methods of 
inquiry, the question must be asked if this orientation toward the natural world is 
necessary, especially given the results of such a view. Alternatively, it could be stated 
that nature and human interest, what is and what ought to be, are not as divergent as the 
subject/object orientation claims them to be. In fact, they may even display a degree of 
amenability. Amenability is the idea that the natural world outside of embodied human 
existence is more than what it appears to be, namely at best indifferent to our worldly 
existence as subjects. The question of nature’s amenability to human existence presents a 
critical problem to any philosophy that seeks to unravel the natural labyrinth while still 
preserving humanity’s ability to make meaningful judgments about the natural world.  
Historically, the paths taken have been largely three-fold: remove human 
meaning from the natural order altogether, an objective approach that seems to limit any 
form of subjectivity; discard any hope of finding objective knowledge, making human 
meaning the only value to be found in nature; or, offer a precarious and bifurcated 
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existence for humanity that places us intellectually in one domain and sensuously in the 
natural world, driving a wedge between our mental life and our bodily life. The first of 
such answers advocates a kind of scientific naturalism, where all knowledge is 
dependent upon the methods and findings of empirical science. Humanity under this 
view is reducible to the mechanism of nature; and, not unsurprisingly, our cultural, 
artistic, and social values become anemic in terms of offering a worldview. For any 
project that seeks to redeem, or at least preserve, the human role in the evaluative 
process, such a turn would be unsatisfactory to the utmost degree. Therefore, little more 
attention will be paid to the scientific naturalist view moving forward in this 
investigation.  
Interest in the creation of human value upon our encounter with nature centers on 
the latter mentioned two of the three historical approaches. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum from naturalism is the idea that the spring of all value can be found in human 
activity. An answer such as this may be reminiscent of Nietzsche’s will to power and the 
collapse of theoretical interest into practical use – a view clearly rejected in the works of 
Martin Heidegger. Thirdly, the route that offers a contentious and bifurcated existence is 
often attributed to Immanuel Kant due to the firm divide that he holds to exist between 
the spheres of theoretical nature and the human practical vocation. Undoubtedly, more 
will be said on both of these stances farther into this study. What is important to note at 
this point is that all means of solving the apparent alienation between human values and 
nature have advocated either a dissolution of any found harmony between human-
formed meaning and the natural world, either through the primacy of empirical science 
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or the rejecting any pure interest in the natural world in favor of practical use, or have 
tried to broker some sort of odd and contentious peace between humanity and the world. 
Needless to say, the amenability problem remains at issue for any thinker that does not 
either denigrate human value as superfluous or embrace a kind of radically subjective 
willing that makes nature there simply in the interest of human projects.  
Unfortunately, the amenability problem between humanity and nature is not a 
phantasm of philosophy that bears no relation to our real-world existence. In short, it is 
not a problem only for the concern of intellectuals. Alienation, attitudes of displacement, 
and general feelings of being ill-at-ease stem from our desire to make our lives somehow 
compatible with the ways of the world and also to make the world agreeable to our own 
wants and desires. With this concern in mind, philosophy, theology, the humanities, and 
even the social sciences can be understood as attempts to make sense out of nature that 
fits human existence and explains human life according to terms that link it to the realm 
of nature. It is why we are never satisfied with the explanation that we are simply 
animals acting on instinct or pure self-interest, nor can humanity as a whole stomach the 
absolute conversion of nature to resources for our various demands. Humankind does not 
wish to sink into the churning and featureless mass of mechanistic nature, to become one 
indistinguishable part amongst the many; however, becoming undisputed lords of the 
earth and utter masters over nature would only further the already strained relation we 
feel when we witness our own alienation. What we seek, then, through the practice of 
art, philosophy, the humanities, and theology is an accord between what essentially 
makes us human and the world in which we find ourselves.  
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A harmonious accord between humans and nature would have to allow for both 
the inclination of humanity to judge meaning while still respecting nature’s right to show 
itself to us and exist for itself. Although these conditions seem to be at odds since both 
humanity and nature are vying to determine meaning when they encounter each other, 
this is the root of the rapport that is to be built between nature and us. It is to be a 
harmonious mediation between nature’s announcing of itself and humanity’s essential 
ability to participate in evaluation. Furthermore, we must seek a harmony, not an 
orientation where either nature or the human will legislates over the other. Only an 
accord can bring the divergent drives of humanity and nature into a relationship that 
allows for a distinctly human place in the world. Anything short of harmony would 
likely lead to either nature’s primacy over human value, scientific naturalism, or all 
human interactions with nature being reduced to use, as we will see in the coming 
discussion of the will. Therefore, the task is to show how it is possible to come home to 
a place that is essentially ours, where we can dwell as humans within and amongst 
nature. 
Having laid out what I believe to be the main issue arching over this 
investigation, the claim can be made that what is at stake in this area of thought is how 
humanity can relate to and find a way through the feelings of alienation and 
displacement we have towards ourselves and towards nature. At the end of our alienation 
is a projected homecoming of sorts, though what this might look like is for now unclear; 
however, sketching out the details of this homecoming will remain central to this project. 
For Kant, we become aware of this accord and subsequently of our own place in nature 
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through aesthetic experience. The approach is descriptive with Kant holding that 
aesthetic experience is simply a part of how we, as humans, live in the world. Heidegger, 
on the other hand, will claim that our age and the modern way of thinking about beings 
precludes us from the kind of existence that allows for a homecoming. Despite Kant 
holding a descriptive solution to the problem of our alienation and Heidegger remaining 
prescriptive on how we are to move forward, the motif of preparation, the importance of 
humanity making itself ready and susceptible for finding a place in nature and 
experiencing a homecoming, is a key similarity that will be further explicated to unite 
the apparently divergent approaches taken by Kant and Heidegger. What is suggestive in 
the fact that neither Kant nor Heidegger posits a hierarchy between humanity, 
encountered nature, and the things themselves, suggests the way forward does not run 
through any answer that attempts to eradicate or overcome the question altogether; 
rather, I hold that amenability between humanity and nature requires an understanding 
and attitude toward the division that does not seek to place the demands of one over the 
other. The relationship, however, can neither be one between two autonomous domains 
that act in seclusion from one another, as I will soon explain; instead, the orientation 
must resemble a harmony between humanity and our world – the particulars of such an 
accord are another obvious task of this study.  
However, it must be stated that the question of this harmonious accord is not one 
of what is, in a hard, determined sense; otherwise, we could simply place our faith in 
natural and experimental science with the belief that, with enough knowledge extracted 
from the phenomenon, humanity will eventually prove that it belongs in nature. Kant’s 
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boundaries of theoretical knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason ended that avenue of 
thought for any who hold value in the Third Critique. Heidegger too, although in the 20th 
Century, saw the practice of science as limited, only one way amongst many that the 
world and the things themselves can be encountered. Rather, the question of rapport 
hinges on the human capability to explore possibility as something other than mere 
phantasm, but exploring possibility without the future promise of bringing it to actuality. 
For Kant, it is in the indeterminacy of aesthetic judgments and the hints of reason to be 
found in art and nature; for Heidegger, it lies in the poetic word and humanity’s dwelling 
upon the earth as the way we can glimpse meaning. Aesthetics and art, then, show the 
latent possibilities of the world, possibilities that require feeling and a certain kind of 
susceptibility for the human to glimpse. This is why, to use the words of Dennis Schmidt 
in Between Word and Image, “works of art possess the capacity to grip us, to hold our 
attention, and to promise more than meets the eye.”1 Ultimately, it is this aesthetic 
moment, the brief pause of the worldly human, which suggests a solution to the chasm 
between world and us. It is my sincerest wish to think this moment to its fullest, 
revealing it as a sign of harmony between human and world, and between our feelings 
towards both life and death. 
Showing the possibility of building rapport between humanity and nature that 
leads to our homecoming in the world hinges upon two critical pieces of terminology – 
nature and the world. The concept of nature is borrowed from the works of Kant, while 
worldhood is drawn from Heidegger’s thought. It is important at this point to then lay 
out what this project will take each to mean and point to key similarities that allow 
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Kantian concerns of nature to enter into conversation with Heideggerian claims about 
the world. Nature for Kant is inherently tied to the idea of lawfulness in regard to 
appearances. One of Kant’s footnotes in the Critique of Pure Reason explains nature by 
these terms. It states, “‘nature’… is understood [as] the sum total of appearances insofar 
as these are in thoroughgoing through an inner principle of causality.”2 From this we can 
see that nature is appearance in accordance with laws. In contrast to the purely human 
sphere of freedom, which Kant will claim as the ‘unconditioned,’ nature is ultimately 
appearance that is conditioned by laws. Further, as appearance, nature is also what we 
can approach in our various interests, more about which will be discussed later; 
however, the important thing to note is that in its immediacy, nature is taken to be 
something external to us. Heidegger’s conception of ‘world’ can be found in a passage 
from Being and Time in which Heidegger states that the world, “designates the 
ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. Worldhood itself may have as its modes 
whatever structural wholes and special ‘worlds’ may have at the time; but it embraces in 
itself the a priori character of worldhood in general.”3 Heidegger’s immediately unclear 
terminology aside, what can be taken from these lines is the idea that the world is that in 
which Dasein always and already finds itself. No one can exist prior to worldhood; 
rather, it is a space in which humanity necessarily lives and carries out everyday actions. 
A way to draw similarities between nature as the totality of appearance in 
accordance with law and the world as an a priori space of existing humans does not 
appear immediately obvious. What allows for comparison and the further ability to use 
the two ideas in conjunction is how nature and the world appear to the modern subject. 
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How each thinker formulates the orientation of contemporary humanity will be further 
explicated later in this section; yet, it is beneficial to note at this juncture that for the 
modern subject, both nature and the world appear as something over and against us. 
Allow me to clarify. We see ourselves as a separate entity, somehow severed from both 
nature and the world. Nature can be approached with an objective eye and its laws can 
be discerned by an exterior entity. The world, our space of existence, becomes populated 
by objects that we come across in our interest and then sink back into a kind of mere 
matter when we turn our focus to something else. This severance allows for an objective 
view on everything that we come across. Scientific vistas are opened for us with such a 
configuration; however, the human relationship with nature and the world is altered at a 
fundamental level. The question is then is whether or not this separation between human 
and nature, between human and world, is necessary, or simply one view amongst many. 
By now it should be clear that this project’s stance is that such a stance against nature 
and the world is not essential. Rather, I hope to discern for a more fundamental 
relationship by way of a possible accord between humanity and nature. 
To support an appeal to a harmonious existence, I will look to both Kant and 
Heidegger, two thinkers who I believe used amiable approaches in an attempt to solve 
the amenability problem and bring humanity closer to finding a distinctly human place 
within, not against, the realm of nature. I had mentioned the harmony that can open the 
possibility for meaningful, human, judgments in the world is one between life and death; 
and, that should humanity wish to understand this harmony, the path lies through 
possibility rather than an appeal to certainty and determinacy. Heidegger, as part of the 
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culmination of his philosophic thought, offered the idea of Gelassenheit as a proper 
attunement between mortal and world that allowed for possibilities. Essentially, 
however, any releasement toward possibility requires a confrontation with our own 
mortal possibility, namely death. I intend on using Gelassenheit as a launching point for 
our orientation toward mortality as one side of the essential harmony I hope to disclose. 
At the other pole of the tension sits Kant’s Third Critique, the foundations of which rest 
on a feeling of life. Although it sometimes passes without notice, Rudolph Makkreel 
points out that the Critique of Judgment specifically links feelings of life with aesthetic 
judgments in that, “when Kant defines the subjective nature of aesthetic judgments, he 
adds the significant…specification that representations are referred to the subject’s 
feeling of life (Lebensgefühl).”4 Although a feeling of life and a confrontation with death 
appear to be opposites, both, I will show, are required to act in a harmonious manner 
should we still wish to hold onto the idea that humanity is capable of making judgments 
about the world that are not either simply knowledge or the result of some violence 
imposed upon nature. Furthermore, this investigation will show that Heidegger’s 
conception of Gelassenheit and the task Kant sets forward in the Third Critique can only 
be completed in each other’s mutual light. If it pleases the reader, allow me to explain in 
more depth why I have selected Kant and Heidegger, and why I believe they are not only 
working to resolve the same problem, but view that the difficulty of meaningful human 
values in accord with the world can be bridged.  
For Kant, the problem can be seen stemming from his topology of the human 
mind, where three major divisions reside. This first is what Kant designates as the 
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“territory,” which is the part of the geography where “cognition is possible for us.”5 This 
is contrasted with the domain, where legislative faculties have full jurisdiction. Our 
experience of the laws of the understanding in relation to nature, then, can only occur in 
the territory, outside of the understanding’s full jurisdiction. This fact ensures that, to use 
Angelica Nuzzo’s words from Ideal Embodiment, “rules of theoretical knowledge, 
insofar as they regard concepts of experience and their objects, are empirical and 
contingent and do not guarantee objective (universal and necessary) cognition.”6 Here 
we see the amenability problem begin to stir within Kant’s critical project. If our 
experience of nature as humans, which occurs only in the territory between the domains 
of full legislation, cannot be tied analytically to either the laws of nature or the laws of 
freedom, what we are left with is potential chaos, or perhaps less dramatically, a 
fragmented experience of the world where humanity is left to string together the 
divergent demands of both nature and reason. This leads to a kind of despair as our 
appearance according to natural laws does not accommodate our moral demands and our 
moral existence cannot find a place in the natural realm. 
Kant’s awareness of this limitation and the seemingly hopeless position in which 
it placed a worldly humanity is evident by the existence of the Third Critique. His work 
opens with this very depiction of transcendental philosophy in the wake of his previous 
two critiques, illustrating the problem of meaningfulness for the human in nature. 
Practical philosophy, the domain of the rational subject, sits opposite of the realm of 
theoretical nature with an incalculable gulf lying between them. Kant makes it perfectly 
clear that his project in the Third Critique is to offer a way to transverse the gulf through 
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the faculty of judgment, showing that the practical realm has influence on the domain of 
nature. A question must be asked, however, as to why Kant thought this project 
necessary after consistently and convincingly arguing for the separation of the practical 
use of reason and our faculties for interpreting the manifold of sense data. At the end of 
the first two critiques, Kant had successfully mapped out the geography of the mind in 
which all faculties had a place and role guided by reason. He had brought the subject-
object orientation to its fullest and clearest fruition with a rational domain on one side 
and objectified things themselves on the other, with no chance of improper intermingling 
between the two. Everything available to humanity was object, and humanity the 
ultimate subject. 
Despite this consistent mapping, Kant undertook the project of the Third Critique 
to allow passage across the cleft between theoretical nature and practical reason. This is 
because Kant foresaw the danger of bifurcated existence and understood that humanity 
cannot find its place in the world if our moral life were radically alienated from nature. 
What remained then was to offer a faculty by which the living human subject could 
interpret their existence in nature. Furthermore, this faculty would have to account for 
the fact that humans experience nature through corporeality, as living bodies. Therefore, 
what Kant offers is not a determinate form of judgment, but rather one of reflection. 
With this brief explanation alone, it is beginning to appear that there is earth upon which 
the subject can stand beyond the limits of practical reason and theoretical nature. It is 
upon this ground that humanity must stand to find its place in the world.  
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Radical alienation between subject and world is not a new concern for 
philosophy, nor did it end with the work of Kant. 20th Century thinkers have wrestled 
with this very issue, notable amongst them being Heidegger who, throughout his body of 
work, confronted the human, first as Dasein and later as mortal, in an attempt to find a 
way of being-in-the-world that overcame the division inherent in the subject-object 
orientation. By thinking through existence by equipmentality, anxiety, groundlessness, 
the will and technology, and the poetic word, Heidegger, despite various changes in his 
thinking through his career, offers ways in which the human being can be rethought 
toward a more originary relationship with the world. Heidegger places our being-
towards-death and the anxiety that it produces as the ontological feature of human 
existence. In short, humanity is aware of its own impending non-existence; and, with no 
essence upon which they can draw, the individual is led to anxiety. Historically, western 
metaphysics has been, according to Heidegger, an attempt to protect the subject from 
this groundlessness in the face of death. The advancement of subjective willing then 
becomes the main theme of his later works – a theme that Heidegger follows until 
contemporary Gestell, en-framing, that leads to the technological will to will.  
Ultimately, Heidegger looks to Gelassenheit, an active letting-be, as the answer 
to de-severing Dasein from the thing itself, a severance occasioned by the radical 
technological way of interacting with the world. Although it is clear that Heidegger 
examined the works of Kant in his young thought, there is no indication that in his 
attempt to think through the will via Gelassenheit Heidegger revisited Kant in general or 
the Third Critique in particular. Thus, the focus of this thesis is to revisit the Critique of 
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Judgment in light of Heidegger’s project of thinking through the will by way of 
Gelassenheit. It is my goal to show that had Heidegger done the same, he would have 
found an amiable text to his project since Kant, more than a century before publication 
of Being and Time, had attempted to confront radical alienation in a similar manner.  
Phenomenology is the method that Heidegger turns toward in order to discern 
our capability of making value judgments about the world. However for Heidegger, the 
concern is not whether we can make such judgments, it is about what is revealed in our 
dealings within the world and how our manner of approach determines this revelation. I 
hold that, although Kant is seeking to show that we are capable of such judgments and 
Heidegger needs to ask no such question since our technological will has already proven 
the human ability to extract meaning from nature, essentially both thinkers are directed 
toward the same problem for similar reasons. Kant’s Third Critique ultimately argues 
that we have a faculty of judgment that allows us to draw value from experience even 
when the laws of the understanding are not a priori to experience. In short, Kant is 
pointing to our feeling of some content beyond what is given to us through natural laws 
as a ground for his investigation into finding a place in the world for humanity that is not 
merely subject to mechanical laws. Heidegger’s phenomenological method is able to see 
what is revealed in a natural scientific comportment, an approach similar to the laws 
provided by the understanding in Kant’s critical philosophy. With this in mind, 
Heidegger’s project is to offer a way that discloses what is left masked by demanding a 
calculated lawfulness from nature. Therefore, both thinkers hold onto the glimpse of the 
	  	   15	  
extra, unlawful, non-cognizable content shining forth from human experience in the 
world as an opportunity to suggest nature as amenable to human life in the world. 
Considering either the incalculable gulf between practical philosophy and 
theoretical nature, or the willful actions of a severed Dasein against the fear of its own 
death in this respect brings forward the problem of the radically alienated subject and 
how this alienation can be navigated. Both Kant and Heidegger in their mature 
philosophic works saw a troublesome distance between humanity and world. Also, both 
endeavored to think their way back through their own philosophy to offer the prodigal 
human a way through their own alienation that would lead to a place in the world for 
Kant, or a homecoming for Heidegger. Finding a home, a place in the world, and 
achieving a certain attentive and reflective relationship with the things we encounter is 
the goal for their late thoughts. Curiously enough, both thinkers turn to aesthetics in art 
and nature as humanity’s guide through the seeming labyrinthine experience of life. For 
Kant, the beautiful in art and nature suspends our conceptualization of that which we 
come into contact, thereby allowing the unfettered imagination to playfully engage with 
our cognitive faculties. Heidegger holds that the revelation engendered by the work of 
art offers a more originary means of disclosiveness that cannot be attained by 
technological grasping. Connecting the two thinkers is the idea that through aesthetics 
humanity is given a glimpse of a more primordial relationship between being and world; 
and, that this relationship is key to the navigation of the gulf between us and world. An 
appeal to art and our receptivity to feeling marks the second key similarity that justifies 
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why my investigation is one of aesthetics – a justification upon which I will now 
elaborate. 
Our living body is the site of our most immediate awareness of the accord 
between nature and humanity. After all, it is clearly both natural and human. Therefore, 
an investigation on this harmony must be tied to our feeling of being alive. The question 
of being-in-the-world and alienation will therefore not be confronted in this work as a 
political or social issue. Rather, I will attempt to point to its roots as essentially aesthetic, 
based on feeling in relation to life. While other efforts have endeavored to bridge the 
gulf between human and world through ideas of community and inclusiveness, Kant’s 
Third Critique offers the issue as one of interpreting meaningfulness from our sensuous 
experience. As illustrated by his desire to demonstrate how the practical realm can 
impact the will of nature, Kant places the foundation of communicability and a sensus 
communis on our ability as beings that are both rational and worldly to make judgments 
based on our feelings engendered by our encounter in the world. The importance of this 
aesthetic turn for Kant can been seen by comparing it to humanity and nature viewed 
purely in the interest of knowledge. 
Unlike judgments grounded in human feeling, judgments in the interest of 
knowledge, as established in the Critique of Pure Reason, subject nature to determinate 
laws of space and time, thereby restricting how nature can appear. In this view, nature is 
mechanical and necessarily law-abiding. However, the human picture of the world 
according to the interest of knowledge has raised, as J.M Bernstein claims, “deep and 
immediate problems about the meaning and intelligibility of organic phenomena, about 
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life, hence about human embodiment.”7 This construction of the world, one where all 
beings are placed under the legislation of mechanical laws brings to the fore the question 
of life – a question that living humanity is the called to answer. Such a reading of nature 
is not amenable to human experience because our sensuous experience is not completely 
contained in the application of conceptual laws.  
Kant understood that, which is why the Critique of Judgment, where he attempts 
to provide an explication of judgment, our ability to draw meaningful relations between 
nature and morality, is an aesthetic work – a text centered on human feeling. Our 
encounters within the world stir feelings that ultimately suggest meaningfulness beyond 
the scope of our conceptual understanding. This feature of our relation to the world has 
implications towards our understanding of life. Are we to simply be the result of the 
electronic firing of neurons, metabolism, and cardiopulmonary pressure? Certainly not, I 
will presume. Taking this answer as essential to the human condition, namely that we 
believe our lives to be more than that which falls under mechanics, we are left with only 
a feeling that there is more than what can be said. This is my point of departure for 
Kant’s critical philosophy: an attempt to show how reflective judgments as laid out in 
the Third Critique can offer a reading of life that engages with the world’s content that 
supersedes our own ability to cognize it. In short, I take up the problem of amenability 
between how we feel our place in the world ought to be and the one shown by the realm 
of nature, with an interest in showing a human way of orientation toward life.  
Heidegger’s eventual stance that the radically subjective will is detrimental to a 
humanity trying to find a meaningful place in the world was a result of his mature 
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thought. On the path starting at Being and Time and moving through all turns of his 
career, Heidegger toyed with various approaches to solving the amenability problem. 
Despite these varied directions, however, Heidegger never lost sight of his goal to 
determine a way of being-in-the-world that allowed the things themselves to reveal 
something other than what our technological will demands of them. Earlier, it was 
mentioned that many consider the amenability problem to be essentially political. It 
comes as little surprise then that during a certain period, Heidegger sought to find a 
resolution through the idea of Volk as a manner of disclosiveness. However, as his 
thought moved on and he became disenchanted with National Socialism, Heidegger still 
thought the will as central to ultimately resolving the amenability problem. In his later 
thoughts on willing, Heidegger turned to aesthetics, especially the work of the poet, as 
being the only way to imbue experience with human value that is not tied to radical 
willing. These brief explications provide a basis for the approach of my project. Kant 
explicitly intends to solve the problem of meaningful human judgments by way of 
aesthetics, founding our experience of the supersensible in a feeling. Heidegger’s path 
trailed its way through the political and finally arrived at poetic naming and the 
relationship between human, poetry, and the world. Therefore, I will take up this 
tradition in my own investigation, establishing my project as essentially aesthetic.  
Beyond the fact that both Kant and Heidegger look to aesthetics as a guide for a 
more originary relationship, to fully argue my point that Kant’s aesthetics and teleology 
in the Third Critique offer something harmonious to what Heidegger sought as 
Gelassenheit, Heidegger’s progression of the history of western metaphysics as will to 
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will needs to be explicated. Doing so will show what is truly at stake in regards to 
technological thinking and Ge-stell in relation to the willful subject’s relation to being. 
Also, this historic perspective will show the particular difficulty in thinking Gelassenheit 
as non-willing, rather than simply not willing. Drawing on Heidegger’s key texts, in 
particular Being and Time and Country Path Conversations, I intend to offer a clear view 
of the progression from his early works to his later texts. In addition, I will use shorter 
pieces on aesthetics and poetry, namely “The Origin of the Work of Art” and “What are 
Poets for?” to demonstrate how Heidegger thinks art, specifically poetry, offers a way of 
thinking that is not inherently willful.  
For Kant, the task will initially be to show how within his greater philosophic 
system reflective judgments differ from the work of cognition. By sorting though the 
orientation of the imagination and understanding, it will be asserted that in the very 
ordering of our transcendental faculties there are signs of subjective willing and a chance 
to think beyond the will. That will come in the form of reflective judgment. 
Additionally, the Third Critique’s overarching theme of unity between the human sphere 
and the realm of nature will provide hints at how the gap can be tested by the subject and 
how these hints relate to our interconnection with art and nature. The idea of 
disinterestedness will also prove valuable going forward and some deal of time and 
effort will be devoted to its clarification. At its completion, the section devoted solely to 
Kant will reveal the Critique of Judgment as a text that values human life, our 
connection with morality within the realm of nature, and the very human task of finding 
a place within the world.  
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Laid out in this manner, it will be my intent to have shown by the third chapter 
the problem of technology and the divided subject as addressed by Heidegger and to 
suggest that Kant, working under similar concerns, offers a way to think Gelassenheit 
that Heidegger might have found had he revisited the Third Critique. Kant’s aesthetic 
insight on human feelings of the invigoration of vital forces is a curious mirror to 
Heidegger’s depiction of anxiety toward death. The tension from which could provide an 
essential step to thinking beyond the will to will that admits, even in the new beginning 
envisioned by Heidegger, there remain living beings that are naturally interested in life. 
Utilizing this tension in reference to a kind of Ur-willing, it will be shown that there is a 
way of being interested in life that fits into Heidegger’s project on the will and that Kant 
provides this orientation to our interest in life. Therefore, the turn away from active 
willing requires a sort of double-sided awareness, toward both interest in life and anxiety 
toward death. Humanity may then take a vigilant stance toward the will as an originary 
interest in finite life; and, because of that guarded interest, can navigate their way in a 
more primal relationship with the world.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Dennis	  Schmidt,	  Between	  Word	  and	  Image	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  8.	  2	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	  trans.	  Paul	  Guyer	  and	  Allen	  Wood	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  A418-­‐19.	  3	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  Being	  and	  Time,	  trans.	  John	  MacQuarrie	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  Perennial	  (1962),	  93.	  4	  	  Rudolf	  Makkreel,	  Imagination	  and	  Interpretation	  in	  Kant:	  The	  Hermeneutical	  
Import	  of	  the	  Critique	  of	  Judgment	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994),	  88.	  5	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  the	  Power	  of	  Judgment	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  5:174.	  6	  Angelica	  Nuzzo,	  Ideal	  Embodiment:	  Kant’s	  Theory	  of	  Sensibility	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  270.	  
	  	   21	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  J.M.	  Bernstein,	  “Judging	  Life:	  From	  Beauty	  to	  Experience,	  from	  Kant	  to	  Chaim	  Soutine,”	  Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 7 
(2000): 158.	  
	  	   22	  
CHAPTER II 
HEIDEGGER AND THE WILL 
Heidegger’s disavowal the will marks a turn in the path of thinking about 
subjectivity and the world. Up until Heidegger, the will had always been taken as an 
ability of the subject to perceive and represent the world in a suitable manner for the 
human intellect. Heidegger, however, reframes the question of the will as one of 
attunement rather than a question of a faculty that the human subjects bring to bear upon 
the world. This attunement that Heidegger uses in reference to the will is one between 
thinking and acting. But, rather than seeing thought and action as opposed forces within 
the subject, Heidegger’s critique of modernity will claim that modern thinking is willing, 
or that even when the modern subject merely thinks about the surrounding world, it is 
activating its power of representation, commanding the world to appear as object that 
can be examined by the active subject. If there is an attunement to be found between 
thought and action, the thinking of the modern subject would represent a kind of 
(dis)attunement1, where even in thinking, the subject is acting upon objective reality. 
This broken harmony represented by subjective willing is seen in Heidegger’s Nietzsche 
Lectures, in his claims that willing is a command upon the world. Heidegger writes, 
“Willing itself is mastery over…”1 Mastery over what? The (dis)attunement of the will 
is mastery over that which appears, namely anything external to the subject in traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  am	  in	  debt	  to	  Bret	  Davis	  for	  this	  phrasing	  of	  attunement	  and	  (dis)attunement	  in	  relation	  to	  Heidegger’s	  critique	  of	  subjective	  willing.	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metaphysics. Therefore, there is no way of thinking the world as anything other than 
object and humans as anything other than subjects in this (dis)attunement.  
This is precisely what Bret Davis explicates as Heidegger’s diagnosis, “that the 
very understanding of the being of beings in terms of ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ is 
implicated in a particular [fundamental attunement] (Grundstimmung).”2 From his 
critique on modern thinking it can be gathered that Heidegger’s project, stemming from 
a rejection of the subject/object orientation, is directed toward finding a more 
fundamental attunement between the world and humanity. Such a direction can be seen 
beginning with his key text, Being and Time, where Heidegger looks to reconfigure the 
way things appear to us in terms of our care. When the avenues provided by human care 
eventually led to ambivalence in terms of the will, Heidegger moved on to contend with 
the thinker whom he thought brought the metaphysical will to its utmost exemplification 
– Nietzsche. Finding Nietzsche’s will to power to be nothing more than a will to further 
willing, Heidegger glimpsed that the source of the expansive will to will could be found 
in what he considered a technological way of directing ourselves toward things we 
encountered. As a solution to this way of comportment, Heidegger suggested that an 
attitude of Gelassenheit, an attentive letting-be, was to be the way in which the modern 
humanity might come upon a ‘new beginning’ beyond the will. Brief as it may be, this 
explanation of Heidegger’s thoughts on the will sketches the arc that this chapter will 
follow in tracing not only the importance of the will, but also the concerns that brought 
Heidegger to think in terms of Gelassenheit and the questions that remain after its 
introduction. 
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What the description above shows is that the problem of the will occupies a 
central place in all turns of Heidegger’s thought. We can also trace the multiple stages of 
his career in terms of his stance toward the will, as done by Bret Davis in Heidegger and 
the Will, and find the designations ‘early Heidegger,’ ‘middle Heidegger,’ and ‘late 
Heidegger’ coincide with different orientations between Dasein and the will. Whether it 
is in Being and Time as resoluteness, Entschlossenheit, his attempt to think a proper will 
in the Nietzsche lectures, or the idea of Gelassenheit as a form of attentive letting-be, 
Heidegger continuously worked through the problematic of the will as a cornerstone to 
unlocking a more originary relationship between Dasein and the world. For all periods in 
Heidegger’s philosophy, it is by the way of the will that the world is disclosed to us; 
and, different orientations of Dasein and the will lead to different manners of 
disclosiveness and ultimately different relationships between Dasein and being. 
Therefore, any examination of Heidegger’s philosophic thought requires an in-depth 
explication of the many forms of willing that arise during his various modes of thought.  
As early as Being and Time, Heidegger was wrestling with the problematic of the 
will and what exactly it means to attune an active being in the world with things that can 
reveal themselves. Phenomenology, the method for Heidegger’s inquiry, seems to 
support the existence of willing as an attunement, and it is the phenomenologist’s task to 
properly align the human and the thing itself. But why is this realignment important? 
Heidegger directs us to the reason behind the need for attunement when he writes, “an 
entity can show itself from itself… in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of 
access we have to it.”3 As Davis further points out, while writing on the subject of the 
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will in Being and Time, “the task of the phenomenologist is to find the proper 
attunement and method with which to assist in letting these things show themselves 
from themselves.”4 Here is the ground floor of the Heideggerian project, so to speak. We 
are Dasein, the kind of being concerned with appearance and meaning – a thing’s being; 
however, that appearance is determined by how we direct ourselves towards the thing. 
The subject/object orientation has historically restricted how things can appear to us, 
namely as severed objects against a subject. Willing and the will can then be enumerated 
as the action and faculty driving the exclusion of all other manners of disclosiveness. 
Phenomenology in Being and Time is supposed to be a way of examining the roots of 
the disclosure that Heidegger holds as endemic to western thought and also a way 
forward from the subject/object orientation. At the very introduction of his seminal 
work, Heidegger is already deeply concerned with the relation of Dasein and what 
appears; and, the primary orientation is to be disclosed through phenomenology.  
What then needs to be determined is the role of the will in early Heidegger’s 
conception of phenomenology. Although frustrating, and yet somehow expected, the 
only answer that Being and Time can provide is at best ambivalent, at worst simply 
nonexistent. Heidegger does not devote a section of the text to willing in particular, but 
it is possible to pick out certain instances where either willing or an abeyance of the will 
can be read into the lines. A single sentence offers what Heidegger claims to be the 
boiled down meaning of phenomenology. He writes, “Thus ‘phenomenology’ means 
αποφαινεσθαι τα φαινοµενα — to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in 
the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”5 From the perspective of subjective 
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willing as a mastery over the external world, the words ‘to let’ suggest a slowing of the 
will that is perhaps similar to the kind of attunement Heidegger wants to show. An 
illustration is offered by the following: on the willful side there is a kind of grasping and 
holding; whereas non-willing indicates a reservation, or letting something be. Therefore, 
at the very foundation of phenomenology, there must be a kind of letting-be, a space 
where the thing is allowed to unfold without being determined by the will. 
Despite this call for an approach that allows the things to disclose themselves, it 
cannot be said that Being and Time is a text devoted to halting of the subjective will. 
After all, in it Heidegger claims that Dasein’s orientation toward the world is primarily 
one of care. While a relationship through care is certainly different from the traditional 
subject-object relationship that perpetuates a ravine between human and world, it can 
hardly be considered a non-willing orientation toward the world. This is revealed in 
Heidegger’s two modes of disclosiveness that an object can have – either being present-
at-hand or ready-to-hand. Heidegger explains with the added emphasis, “Entities…are 
encountered in a world of involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and 
which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves.”6 Being ready-to-
hand means the thing reveals itself in its use towards the various projects of Dasein. For 
the Heidegger of Being and Time, this is the most authentic way of disclosing Being. It 
is difficult to see how the most authentic way of disclosiveness can be read as anything 
other than willful because entities that are ready-to-hand make themselves known in 
relation to our involvement with them. Nor can presence-at-hand, Heidegger’s other 
mode of disclosing, be the kind of letting-be relationship that the introduction calls for 
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either. It is best described as an object being there on the periphery, kind of severed 
subject-object distinction that phenomenology is meant to dissolve. 2 
The phenomenology of Being and Time is suggestive of the will as fundamental 
attunement between Dasein and the world evidenced by how human involvement 
signifies the authentic way of being-in-the-world. Therefore, while the metaphysics of 
subjective willing as a faculty might have been dissolved, the human as Dasein still 
occupies an active, caring place influencing the appearance of things. Moving beyond 
this aspect of Heidegger’s will requires a further turn in the narrative. The new problem 
for Heidegger is the will as affectation and passion – Nietzsche. Being and Time’s 
sought to remove the subjective will of modernity by means of comportment and the 
care of Dasein; however, the will guided by care and directed in terms of the various 
concerns and projects of Dasein leads to the possibility of all disclosure of being as 
practical use, or in terms of how Dasein can use whatever thing appears before it. This is 
why the confrontation with Nietzsche is a key turn in Heidegger’s thought. It represents 
a move to solve a problem of the will that the phenomenological apparatus of Being and 
Time could not. While some hold that Heidegger is embracing Nietzsche’s will, I 
contend that the Nietzsche Lectures are setting up a problem of the will as it emerges in 
Being and Time to be resolved later through the idea of Gelassenheit. It appears to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  a	  full	  explication	  on	  Heidegger’s	  ambivalence	  toward	  the	  will	  and	  willing	  in	  
Being	  and	  Time,	  see	  chapter	  2	  of	  Bret	  Davis’	  Heidegger	  and	  the	  Will.	  There,	  he	  offers	  four	  interpretations	  of	  resoluteness,	  Entschlossenheit.	  One	  is	  as	  willful	  resolve.	  The	  second	  offers	  a	  reading	  that	  uses	  the	  conception	  of	  resolution	  as	  a	  way	  of	  self-­‐(re)interpretation.	  A	  third	  claims	  irredeemable	  ambiguity;	  and	  the	  fourth	  is	  a	  way	  between	  all	  three	  where	  resoluteness	  is	  a	  self-­‐inturrupting	  force	  that	  willfully	  halts	  the	  will.	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characteristic of Heidegger’s project to confront and attempt to embrace the problem 
before being able to think through it. Remaining true to this manner, rather than 
overcoming will to power, Heidegger thinks through Nietzsche with the will to mastery.  
Nietzsche’s will to power, as confronted by Heidegger, stems from the ‘death of 
metaphysics,’ or the assertion that values and meaning found in the world has no 
metaphysical foundation. In the face of this absence of meaning, Nietzsche claims that 
all is will and values are for humans to form. For Nietzsche all meaning is the result of 
our will and our willing is directed toward the enhancement and stabilization of our 
power. Hence, we are driven by this goal, a will to power. The Nietzsche Lectures 
provide a broad elucidation of what this means, an explanation that not only clarifies the 
action of the will, but also frames it in terms of meaning. Heidegger notes that the will is 
tied to  “above all an attunement which is so disposed that nothing is foreign to it, 
nothing too much for it, which is open to everything and ready to tackle anything.”7 This 
enthusiasm of the will to go out and confront all that it encounters is possible only if 
there is no metaphysical meaning beyond what is declared by humanity. Lack of value is 
not only the cause for anxiety but it also points to the empowerment of our will. 
Heidegger appropriates this claim that Nietzsche deems fundamental, but will twist it 
into a symptom of our age, not part of the essence of our being. This is shown in 
Heidegger’s claim that humanity faces anxiety, the “phenomenon of Dasein’s fleeing in 
the face of itself and in the face of its authenticity.”8 Anxiety is no longer a fundamental 
aspect of our being, but rather a retreat from our authenticity. It is a retreat from what is 
fundamentally Dasein, namely the awareness of our non-existence. Also, however, it is a 
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flight from authenticity. For Heidegger, Dasein is represented as groundless and thrown 
into the world. The idea of groundlessness appears beyond Being and Time and remains 
a central aspect of not simply Heidegger’s conception of the will, but also his larger 
philosophic picture. In the essay, “What are poets for?” Heidegger describes the times as 
destitute in terms of being and “there fails to appear for the world the ground that 
grounds it.”9 This groundlessness, endemic first to Dasein itself and then given over to 
the modern epoch, is the source of fear and anxiety for the living human. As such, 
Dasein is called upon to act, or comport itself, in relation to this groundlessness, toward 
the abyss of our being. Anxiety, then, is the basis for the will beyond which Heidegger 
seeks to think. Anxiety causes flight, a retreat from awareness of our non-existence and 
the recognition of no metaphysical foundation to the world. Yet, Dasein is called upon to 
act, or comport itself, in relation to this groundlessness, toward the abyss of our being. 
Security and certainty are not to be found in the abyss of Dasein’s 
groundlessness. Heidegger uses the term ‘venture’ to illustrate the being of beings. From 
the connotations of this chosen word we might think of risk, reward, uncertainty, and 
danger. Therefore, to be implies a danger to the being. Likewise, as Heidegger explains, 
“That which were… to remain out of danger… would not have been ventured. It would 
not be in danger if it were shielded.”10 Notice how the difference between the dangers of 
the venture and perceived safety are not the differences between activity and passivity. 
To not venture, to avoid the danger of being, the being does not simply disengage with 
the world; rather, shields itself behind the act of assigning value and meaning against the 
void. Shielding is an action in the face of groundlessness designed to protect the 
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endangered being. This orientation of venturing and shielding marks a subtle difference 
from authenticity and inauthenticity of Being and Time. Whereas a case could be made 
that the authentic, care-full, and resolute Dasein is primarily active and willful is 
opposed to the inauthentic Dasein, who simply goes along with das Man, such 
distinctions are harder to make in the works of later Heidegger. Venturing may be called 
a kind of activity; but in comparison to the shielding of non-ventured being, the attitude 
that is less authentic toward the anxiety of groundlessness appears to be more active and 
willful, throwing up guards against what is most fundamental to being. It is in this way 
that the problematic of the will, as conceived by Heidegger, transcends activity and 
passivity. 
Keeping in mind the themes of anxiety, groundlessness, and protection in the 
face of venturing, we are ready to investigate Heidegger’s critical phenomenology of the 
will to power in an effort to show that Heidegger did not envision an embrace of the will 
as a fundamental part Dasein, but rather part of the age in which we find ourselves. 
Shielding the vulnerable being from the abyss can only be done through the process of 
valuation – reaching beyond the will and securing value to be stored for future 
encounters. This makes appearance consistent. It is not hard to see how consistency by 
way of the will is contrasted with die Wage,3 hazard or risk. Venturing out from the 
protection risks what has been grasped and propels the being into groundlessness as 
opposed to a manufactured grounding of similitude. Now, however, it is not simply the 
willful being that is determined by the use of the will, but also the things it encounters. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  “What	  are	  Poets	  For?”	  for	  Heidegger’s	  full	  etymology	  on	  die	  Wage.	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These things, rather than able to show themselves, are incorporated into the expansively 
determining will. This leads to Davis’ claim that, “Willing is always a willing out 
beyond oneself, and therefore must be distinguished… from… the static sense of a 
solipsistic ego cut off from the world.”11 The will to reaches out and enhances the power 
and breadth of its domain by assigning value to the things. It is this activity of evaluation 
without regard to the thing’s own being that leads Heidegger to reconfigure Nietzsche’s 
will to power as an epochal will to will, since all that is being preserved in our activities 
is the will itself.  
Notice here how the human existence has been considerably altered from Dasein 
in an abyss of meaning when a human-determined value is placed between the ‘ego’ and 
the world of things themselves. Most notably is the change from a being-amongst-beings 
to now a being-against-beings, where the subject has drawn boundaries between 
themselves and the world. The attitude taken up by the guarded subject is antagonistic, 
where the world beyond the grasp of their will threatens to sweep away their secure 
footing and drag the sheltered ego into the abyss. This antagonistic disposition is at root 
in the subject-object relation between humanity and world. Considered in this manner, 
three rather startling conclusions emerge about the prevalent understanding of the 
human psyche over and against the corporeal world: Firstly, that this relationship is 
caused by anxiety toward existential groundlessness and the subsequent shielding of the 
ego against the outside world. Secondly, the subject-object relationship is not a simple 
encapsulation of the timid ego against the dangers of the world, but a radically willing 
ego that incorporates and secures the things to its own ends; and finally, that our 
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understanding of the subject and object is not essential to the being of humans in the 
world. The first of these realizations has already been discussed. The second will be the 
next point of focus as Heidegger’s phenomenology of the will to will and the 
problematic of technology. The third will be the final aspect of this chapter and will 
point the way to a conception of Gelassenheit. 
Willful incorporation of beings by the guarded subject leads to the division of 
humanity as subjects against a background of objects in addition to the expansion and 
hardening of the will’s territory. However, the question remains as to how this claim 
leads to Heidegger’s claim that the will to power is simply a will to will. The answer lies 
in exactly what the will wills, which Heidegger’s phenomenology shows is nothing 
more than a continuation of active willing – hence, the will to will. This is not to be 
taken as a philosophically uninteresting tautology, however; rather, it is an indicative 
statement about the threat of the endangered subject as it reaches out from behind its 
protective coverings. Attached to this dynamic willing is the aspect of an unquenchable 
need for growth – the reaching action mentioned earlier. Security, then, is not the only 
driving force behind the will. If the will is, as Heidegger claims, a will to power and 
power is a will to power,4 then instead of a tautology, there appears to be a circular 
effect upon the willful activities of the subject. Power demands the expansion of the 
willful domain, but the protective will demands a secure ground upon which to stand. 
Therefore, although the subject is involved in constant activity, Heidegger, through his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  the	  second	  volume	  of	  Heidegger’s	  lectures	  on	  Nietzsche.	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phenomenology of the will, holds the activity brings about a willful recurrence of the 
same.  
Returning to a more Heideggerian lexicon, the things themselves become objects 
and the originary Dasein, whom Heidegger claims has the chance to wager themselves 
for a more originary relationship, becomes “a kind of ‘encapsulat[ed] ego… in the 
aggressive sense of expanding the territory of the ego to include the world in its field of 
power.”12 In short, the subject becomes a lord of the earth; and, the manner in which 
being is disclosed to the guarded subject is now completely in terms of use and ability to 
feed the expansion of the will, which can be seen in Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
Nietzschean ‘estimation of value.’ Heidegger writes, “The essential determination of 
everything essential is based on ‘value estimations.’ What is essential is conceived as 
essential exclusively with regard to its character as value.”13 Nietzsche collapsed all 
value as will to power, a move made possible in the face of a lack of metaphysical 
meaning. Heidegger appropriates this pronouncement as the diagnosis of our age, 
claiming that modern values are a result of the expansive will. Heidegger’s fear is that 
everything, every encounter, is framed in terms of the thing’s use, to use Nietzsche’s 
words, or its value in terms of securing us against the draft, to speak towards more 
Heideggerian concerns. Either way, modern human comportment conditions the thing’s 
appearance to the point where it can no longer show itself. Our comportment that 
Heidegger claims to pervade all encounters between Dasein and things-in-the-world is 
technological. The technological comportment therefore becomes a central focus in not 
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only Heidegger’s critique of the modern will, but also vital to understanding how 
modernity can be thought through to a ‘new beginning.’ 
Heidegger speaks of technology in a very particular manner that reflects the 
concerns of his phenomenological project as described in the introduction of Being and 
Time. Recall that his explication of phenomenology centered on the orientation between 
that which appears and to whom it appears, and how this orientation affects the thing’s 
disclosiveness. Technology is similar to phenomenology in that what concerns 
Heidegger is not the what of the investigation, an assortment of electronic tools that we 
normally envision when thinking of technology, but the how. In the case of technologic 
thinking, this would manifest as what is disclosed to us in the technological worldview 
and how what is disclosed relates to us and the thing itself. Heidegger, knowing the 
common conception of technology states in his essay “The Question Concerning 
Technology,” “Technology is… therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of 
revealing.”14 A technological way of comportment reveals what things are to Dasein; the 
issue, however, is that being comported technologically determines in advance how 
things appear. Understanding this about technology allow us to examine it in a new way, 
in hope of opening a new relationship between humanity, technology, and the world. 
Making this distinction is vital to Heidegger’s project because in the first 
paragraph of the previously quoted work on technology, Heidegger calls for a free 
relationship between humanity and technology. He writes, “The relationship will be free 
if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to 
this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds.”15 
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Therefore, the goal is to get closer to the essence of technology and not simply offer a 
description of the technological. Getting to this essence, however, requires a fair amount 
of thought, especially given the prevalence of technological means in modern society. 
Heidegger points to this difficulty and its inherent danger in writing about the neutrality 
by which we view the mechanized world. “Regard[ing] it [technology] as something 
neutral… makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.”16 Breaking from the 
normal way of speaking5 about technology and thinking to its essence are vital to the 
task at hand – confronting technology as a willful means of disclosiveness that 
dominates the modern view of the world. In order to show how technology discloses and 
what this means to the human in the world, it was first necessary to elucidate technology 
as an orientation, it being as more complex than what we normally encounter. 
Technology, more than simply the fine-tuned instruments of modernity, is a way 
of revealing. Heidegger, in his essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” speaks to 
the very issue of technology as a way of revealing. Poiēsis is the term he uses to 
describe that which reveals. However, poiēsis carries a broad meaning that encompasses 
not only technology, but also fine art and physics as well. Of these ways of revealing, 
Heidegger says, “they are unifiedly governed by a bringing that brings what presences 
into appearance.”17 Difficult language aside, technology is a poiēsis, a way that brings 
the emergent thing into our view. However, Heidegger notes, “the revealing that holds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Contrast	  Heidegger’s	  want	  to	  think	  through	  technology	  with	  his	  description	  of	  how	  we	  speak	  about	  it.	  It	  is	  a	  theme	  that	  goes	  back	  to	  Being	  and	  Time	  with	  his	  discussion	  on	  the	  inauthentic	  chatter	  of	  the	  other.	  Conflating	  technology	  as	  a	  way	  of	  disclosiveness	  with	  technology	  as	  a	  means	  to	  some	  human	  end	  is	  how	  the	  essence	  of	  technology	  was	  covered	  and	  leveled	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  apparent	  neutrality	  by	  which	  we	  regard	  it	  in	  modern	  society.	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sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of 
poiēsis.”18 Instead, modern technology challenges that which it is supposed to reveal. A 
challenge is a demand upon something, not an occasion for it to show itself. Therefore, 
what humans gain from challenging is not something essential about the thing, but 
something technology has imposed upon it. Therefore, the concern is that due to the 
dominance of technology in the modern era, all revealed value is in reference to 
technological demand, and not in respect to something essential to the thing itself. Hans 
Ruin while writing on one of Heidegger’s last written pieces, a greeting to the Heidegger 
Circle in 1976, summarizes Heidegger’s caution against the technology. It reads, “a 
world stamped by technology is also a world characterized by a forgetfulness of 
being.”19 6 Ruin is pointing to a relationship between technology and its prevalence in 
‘stamping’ the modern world. Revelation through technological thinking suggests 
forgetfulness, namely forgetting that things can disclose themselves in our encounter 
with them. The forgetfulness is on the human side of the orientation; when we take a 
technological stance toward things, the things themselves are forgotten and replaced by 
what appears through technology. Forgetfulness toward the being of beings can only 
come about if something appears in its stead, something that, in its way of revealing, 
distracts and blocks Dasein from experiencing a thing’s own meaning, since its value 
has already been determined technologically beforehand.  
Were nothing revealed through technology, it would be an impossible 
comportment towards the things, since Heidegger has, from the outset of his project in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  appears	  in	  Radical	  Phenomenology:	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  ed.	  John	  Sallis	  (Atlantic	  Highlands,	  NJ:	  Humanities	  Press,	  1978).	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Being and Time, place Dasein at the center of the unfolding of being. Instead, something 
very particular is revealed by the technological orientation of the will, and herein lies the 
danger. Davis writes, “Technology names a highly restrictive way in which beings are 
revealed, and concealed.”20 Turning back for a moment to the description of the 
phenomenological project, recall that at its roots phenomenology is the way in which the 
things reveal themselves from within themselves. Immediately, we see that modern 
technological thinking is a hindrance to that effort. After all, an external restriction on 
what can be both revealed and concealed blocks the thing itself from unfolding itself 
from in itself. Heidegger uses the example of modern physics in his essay on technology 
to demonstrate the effects of technology on the unfolding of nature to the human 
subject.7 He explains that modern physics, and most of modern science for that matter, 
“is challenged forth by the rule of enframing, which demands that nature be orderable as 
standing reserve… [and] will never be able to renounce this one thing: that nature report 
itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remain 
orderable as a system of information.”21 Technology places demands and restrictions on 
nature’s unfolding, only allowing that which can be reduced to formulation and 
processed as information to reveal itself. The ordering of nature is how the will to will 
allows humanity to orient itself toward nature. Rather than being amongst nature, the 
will demands, due to its insatiable need to expand and secure, that humans take 
mastership over nature through its systematic ordering as a source of information and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  According	  to	  Heidegger,	  modern	  physics	  is	  technological,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  usually	  attributed	  in	  our	  everyday	  speech.	  Normally,	  we	  think	  of	  physics	  as	  technological	  because	  its	  practice	  utilizes	  electronic	  mechanisms;	  however,	  Heidegger	  will	  claim	  its	  technicity	  is	  due	  to	  its	  demands	  on	  nature.	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energy. Working under the will to will, then, this is the relationship humanity can have 
with the world. We become both lords and prisoners in our own objective castles, 
surrounded by tall walls whose boundaries we cannot cross. Nature cannot be touched, 
only grasped, summoned to our hands, and ordered about for the sake of our projects. 
This is what technology reveals to us. Concealed, its absence glaring, is any originary 
relation between the human and the thing itself. 
Perhaps it could be argued that Heidegger’s conception of the technological will 
to will is simply a critique of modern science and technology. ‘Sure,’ the skeptic might 
say, ‘science calls for this kind of orientation because its goals are directed toward 
empirical knowledge.’ They might go on to argue that the technological view can be 
utilized by science and discarded when we leave that realm of thought. Surely the Rhine, 
to use Heidegger’s example, can be used as a source of hydroelectric power and yet can 
still be appreciated as the river. Yes, but how? As something to be viewed as other, as 
separate nature, as something to take pictures of, to be gawked at via social media, as a 
mere line crossed off on a ‘bucket list,’ so to speak. What this reveals is that even 
beyond the fields of modern science, technological thinking precludes things from 
appearing as what they really are; rather, our comportment predetermines meaning 
relative to their usefulness. As we shall see in thinking the phenomenology of 
technology to its fullest extent, even human life is not fully immune from ordering in the 
service of the advancing will.  
This possibility was hinted at earlier when technology’s essence was disclosed 
not as a means, but as a form of revelation based on the orientation of anxious, guarded 
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subject against its groundlessness existence in the world. Now, the actuality comes to 
fruition: Our technological thinking causes us to relate to other humans not in accord 
with what they are, but, like objects, in a manner that predetermines their value in terms 
of usefulness. Humanity, too, has become a resource. This is the supreme diagnosis of 
the modern age; yet, Heidegger, perhaps surprisingly, is neither pessimist nor 
romanticist on the issue despite the tones of both that emerge in his thinking. There is a 
way through this technological predicament that does not involve a resignation to 
becoming part of the standing-reserve of energy. The subject takes part in the process of 
unconcealment. That is, Dasein has a particular role in the disclosiveness of beings. We 
need only look back as far as the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand distinctions in Being 
and Time to see how human comportment and care occupies a central role in the 
unfolding of beings. Technology, despite its restrictiveness, is still a way in which things 
are revealed and concealed within the world. For this to happen, i.e. for technology to 
take place, there must still remain humans, not mere objects of the standing-reserve, to 
take up the task of disclosiveness. At the utmost extent of this kind of technological 
willing, humanity occupies a dual position as being converted partially into standing 
reserve, but also as the force behind the ordering of resources to maintain the 
technological will to mastery. It is the inability to be reduced to mere energy sources that 
Heidegger picks up on as, to use Davis’ words, a “‘first hint,’ and ‘echo,’ or a ‘ringing 
forth’ (Anklang) of a more originary correspondence to being.”22 In true Heideggerian 
fashion of thinking through the problem by facing its essence, this echo can only be 
heard on the precipice of complete abandonment to technology.   
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Confronting the problematic of the will hinges on a paradox. The will can only 
be overcome by, paradoxically, willing to not will. Heidegger had this complication in 
mind when trying to sort out the role of the will beyond modernity. Heidegger sought a 
third way, one that ran between the active will and passivity, an active way of letting 
things show themselves – Gelassenheit. Gelassenheit is what Heidegger designates as 
the relationship to not overcome the will, but rather to think through it. I draw attention 
to the distinction between overcoming the will and thinking through it because as is 
shown in Country Path Conversations, to reject willing, or to will the overcoming of the 
will, is still essentially willful. Therefore, as the conversation points out, the relation 
between non-willing and the will is essentially ambiguous.8 A bit of reflection will 
clarify why this is so. Struggling against the will in order to abolish it from our thinking 
is, essentially, a will to non-willing. That is why the project of thinking through the will 
cannot be solely one of action against some force. Yet, it could be argued that to 
embrace something akin to fatalism, or Meister Eckhart’s releasement toward the divine 
will, is simply a form of willful deferral or even covert willing.9 Neither activity nor 
passivity seem to offer a viable option in the problematic of the will. Davis speaks of the 
problem at hand when he writes, “We need to disaccustom ourselves from the 
contradictory will to reach Gelassenheit, and yet this disaccustoming itself seems to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  Country	  Path	  Conversations,	  77-­‐80,	  for	  the	  full	  line	  of	  conversation.	  	  9	  I	  draw	  here	  on	  the	  Nietzschean	  critique	  of	  the	  asceticism.	  For	  a	  full	  excursus	  on	  the	  relation	  of	  Heidegger,	  Eckhart,	  and	  the	  will,	  see	  chapter	  5	  of	  Davis,	  On	  the	  Way	  
to	  Gelassenheit.	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require Gelassenheit.”23 A troublesome knot that, with any luck, can be at least loosened 
with some further explication. 
Caution is needed to avoid the tempting conclusion that countering the active 
will requires that humanity detach itself from beings and restrain our inclinations to 
determine value. This is not what Heidegger had in mind when speaking of 
Gelassenheit. It is not a passive, inactive waiting that illustrates our way of being that is 
to free us from the will; instead, it is an attentive letting-be that characterizes 
Gelassenheit. In correspondence with beings, there is a middle-voice that is neither 
silence nor a demand. We are not to simply take all appearance as meaning, nor are we 
to determine value before any encounter. Instead, the best picture that can be offered is 
one akin to conversation where meaning is exchanged, questioned, and opened for 
debate. Conversation cannot occur in either extremes of pure demanding or utter silence. 
Dialogue, speaking, communing with the things themselves is more originary than the 
willful pursuit of technology or its passive opposite. It also allows for human activity 
within the world, but simply a different kind than what is required by technology. 
‘Language speaks’ (die Sprache spricht) as a line from Heidegger is an exemplar of such 
a relation. Language and nature speak to humanity where values can be found, but there 
is an opportunity to speak back, to converse, to offer a human answer. Conversation, 
taken as a reciprocal speaking and listening, is the kind of originary relationship that 
Heidegger seems to suggest. However, it is not a dialogue that would mimic the kind of 
speech that humans have with each other on an everyday basis; but rather, we would 
find a new means of communion between the things themselves and humanity, and 
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further also between humans. This suggestion will come back into play with 
Heidegger’s discussion of the poet.  
We begin to have a sense of what Heidegger is suggesting in his turn away from 
the will. The world reveals itself to us in this more originary relationship and we are 
there to answer back to its revealing. Perhaps it is not surprising that, opposed to the 
revealing offered by technology, works of art are said to disclose truth in an originary 
and special manner. It is this turn to art, not aesthetics in its traditional usage, as we are 
warned by Heidegger, which may provide some illustration of how a modern, 
technological, epoch can begin to see things beyond their mere standing-reserve and 
witness the opening of a world from itself.10 As Jonathan Dronsfield writes in his essay 
on Heidegger and the work of art, “The work… is to open up a world of beings such as 
to show things in their emergence.”24 A space is opened up within the artwork that 
allows humans to see a new world of beings, again and for the first time. Art is a means 
of disclosiveness that is not ordered by use or subject to the will. In fact, Heidegger 
makes a particular point to avoid such confusions that might result in thinking that art 
opens the world of the artist for the viewer. He insists that the artist is largely 
inconsequential to the work of art, claiming that the artist, “destroys itself in the creative 
process for the world to emerge.”25 There is little of the subjective technological will in 
the revealing of art. Instead, humanity is set before a world in which new disclosiveness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Heidegger	  prefers	  the	  use	  of	  “the	  work	  of	  art”	  rather	  than	  “aesthetics.”	  For	  Heidegger,	  aesthetics	  represents	  a	  willful	  appropriation	  of	  art	  to	  extract	  the	  idea	  of	  beauty	  from	  the	  work	  itself.	  “Aesthetics”	  then	  becomes	  a	  science	  for	  the	  art	  industry	  to	  move	  and	  store	  “beautiful”	  works	  for	  proper	  display.	  My	  use	  of	  the	  term	  will	  reflect	  this	  usage.	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can occur. Perhaps this is why Heidegger turns to works of art, and even more so to the 
poetic word, in his later thoughts on thinking through the will. It is because works of art 
and the poetic word are an encounter that attempts to halt even the modern will to 
mastery. Although “art industry,” Heidegger warns us, is dangerous to the opening of 
the new world, the work of art remains the closest exemplar to this originary relationship 
that we have in the face of the technological will.  
What is called upon in the age of radical concealment and ordering of the things 
themselves as standing-reserve, is a relationship that runs up against and checks the will, 
one that may be similar to the relationship described in our dealings with the work of art. 
The question remains of whether or not the will is to remain beyond Heidegger’s ‘new 
beginning.’ Let us reframe the question of will by looking at what is at stake should, if 
such things were possible, any form of willing be stripped from the human subject. 
Perhaps the most audacious manifestations of willfulness are claims that place humanity 
as the measure of the world, the ultimate arbiter of value and judgment. Tradition, 
values, morals, and customs are part of subjective existence in the world. Their totality 
illustrates human activity and interest throughout history. Does Gelassenheit then call 
for a radical reassessment of customs and an immobilization of our human capacity to 
assign value and hold to traditions? While there is definite hermeneutical import in a 
reevaluation of values and meaning, Gelassenheit in some instances may seem to 
suggest that humanity can no longer assert tradition or build culture without the leave of 
the things themselves. It is not a matter of simply wanting to hold on to our ability to 
develop culturally and determine ourselves as people, but can we even do otherwise? 
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Can we decide, so to speak, to allow nature and the things themselves to establish 
human values and enter into the scaffolding of our culture? 
The answer resides, albeit partially, in the function of the poet in an age of 
radical non-disclosiveness. Returning to the source of technology and the need for a turn 
toward Gelassenheit, we are reminded that it was groundlessness in the face of the abyss 
that brought about the need for protection and a severance of the subject from the world 
of objects. To think beyond the will would require not only releasing the barrier between 
humanity and the world, but also entering into an unguarded relationship with the 
groundless draft. After all, simply letting down the shield does not show active 
engagement with existential groundlessness. This is why Heidegger, in his attempt to 
offer an orientation beyond the bounds of will, delved into poetry and the relation 
between the poet and the things themselves. As shown in his aesthetics, the unfolding of 
the things in art is other than the restrictive disclosiveness in terms of technology; and it 
is the poet that exemplifies this relation best amongst humanity. Heidegger looks to the 
poets as “the most mortal amongst mortals… the most daring… the most ventured,” to 
offer a full way of thinking through the will.26 They are the most mortal, daring, and 
ventured because they face their mortality, their existential safety as the wager, to 
achieve a more originary relationship with the things themselves.  
Heidegger offers us precious little beyond this, leaving readers to piece together 
the rest based on the body of his philosophic work. Poets offer a certain comportment 
towards the things themselves that is a form of waiting appropriate with Gelassenheit; 
however, Heidegger only looks to poetry in destitute times. Unless the new beginning 
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offered is also to be destitute, this orientation seems lacking. Humans will engage with 
the world and can do so in a non-technological manner, as evidenced by the work of art. 
But in our freedom to encounter things-in-the-world, every experience as described by 
our attentive waiting seems to become radically new. Rather than in technology, where 
nothing is essentially new, there is nothing saved in the non-willing orientation. It seems 
that the human is once again at an impasse, with radical grounding on one end and 
extreme forgetfulness on the other. There can only be one answer that goes beyond 
despair – the will must, in some form and fashion, remain. It is the means by which we 
enter into meaningful relations with objects of the world. Rampant subjectivity led to the 
will to will, but for humanity to be the site of disclosiveness, for us to take part in the 
unfolding of truth, we must retain an aspect of our will, despite the danger of slipping 
back into subjectivity.  
Then, there is no ultimate resolution, only a tension that demands to be 
understood. Davis picks up on this tension in noting that, “the revealing of ek-sistence 
already essentially involves a tendency toward concealment, because it always reveals 
beings in a particular way.”27 In our encounter with beings, willful or otherwise, there is 
always that which is revealed and that which is concealed. Beings are never fully 
revealed in any single disclosing. Therefore at the moment of revealing, there is a 
drifting away from the originary encounter and toward that which is revealed in our 
involvement with the being itself. Humanity, even free from the grip of the will to will, 
is always at a distance from the full being of beings. In “The Essence of Truth” 
Heidegger speaks of this essential relationship. He writes, “Man errs. Man does not 
	  	   46	  
merely stray into errancy. He is always astray in errancy.”28 As we have seen throughout 
this chapter, this errancy brought about by the forgetfulness of the originary encounter is 
taken to its extreme in the epoch of technology; yet, there is no way to dissolve this 
estrangement from being, even in the ‘new beginning.’ The task then becomes thinking 
through the tension between the freedom toward beings that is achieved through our 
attentive letting-be of them through Gelassenheit and the essential forgetfulness of our 
involvement with the beings.  
This is the project left unfinished by the late works of Heidegger, one that he had 
started in the introduction of his seminal work Being and Time. Phenomenology as the 
way in which thing reveal themselves from themselves and its relation to the will 
occupied a foundational place in Heidegger’s philosophy during all turns of his thought 
and all engagements with philosophy. Through a career of thought, we are left with 
Gelassenheit, as the answer to the technological will to will. While it possibly represents 
a viable means to think through the modern age, it leaves unanswered our relation to the 
will beyond the ‘new beginning’ and those post-Heidegger are left with the charge of 
thinking past Heidegger for an answer. Certain facets of the will appear to be indelibly 
situated within our engagement with beings-in-the-world; and as such, humanity appears 
to always be capable of falling back into radical subjectivity. Therefore, to think beyond 
Heidegger requires grappling with the existent will in terms of the tension between 
freedom of engagement and forgetfulness of the very same engagement.  
Gelassenheit is a leap from the technological epoch, but a leap to where? Can 
such a question be rightfully asked, expecting an answer? Given the danger of the will, 
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and the ever-present possibility of falling back into an orientation towards the world 
guided by the will, I believe this question must be asked. The answer, however, cannot 
be determinate. Rather, the leap suggested through Gelassenheit will land us in a sort of 
tension, where a particular harmony must be found. That harmony was hinted at earlier, 
as one between freedom of existence and forgetting in insistence. At its root, amazingly 
enough, is not simply our engagement toward beings-in-the-world, but the entire human 
comportment to life on one hand, and death on the other. Heidegger has already 
challenged humanity to face its non-existence in the draft with the example of the poet, 
as a daring, groundless, letting-be in the face of death. With that in mind, what then 
remains is how are we challenged to live.	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CHAPTER III 
 KANT, IMAGINATION, AND LIFE 
Gelassenheit, as a response to modern willing, showed how humanity could 
direct itself towards awareness of its own death. As helpful as this might be to thinking 
through the will, it only accounts for one concern that stirs humanity. Beyond death, it is 
not controversial to claim that humans are also interested in life, in particular, our own 
lives and how they can be enriched. If we are to live as humans, meaning we take part in 
the assignment of values and find meaning in the world, we must have some awareness 
of our own lives as also having value. Finding meaning in life against a world that 
seems, at best, indifferent to human existence is not a new concern for philosophy, nor is 
it the first time that feelings of liveliness are suggested as a cornerstone for human 
edification against the natural world. Feelings of life were a point of focus for 19th 
Century philosophy coming out of Kant’s Third Critique. Romanticists keyed into the 
invigoration of life to show the need for aesthetics and culture, holding that the 
advancement of the quality of human life was the goal of history and civilization. Not 
incidentally, this was also the age of philosophy that witnessed the greatest expansion of 
the role of the will in human activity – a tradition of the will stretching from Fichte, 
Schelling, and onto Hegel, a trajectory that eventually brought about Nietzsche’s 
complete embrace of the will and Heidegger’s subsequent attempts to rethink this aspect 
of human existence. Historically then, feelings of life and its enrichment are tied to the 
expansion of the will.  
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My project seeks to think backwards to Kant’s Third Critique in an attempt to 
find a way of both thinking and feeling life that does not involve an expansion of the 
will to the size at which it appears after Kant. Doing so will require a reinvestigation of 
the Third Critique, not as an attempt to synthesize Kant’s theoretical and practical 
philosophy, but as a work that displays an overall harmony between the two spheres of 
human activity whose goal is to find for humanity a place in the world, despite the 
apparent rift between our practical purposes and the realm of nature. What I will argue 
then is that feelings of life indicate an overarching harmony between the divergent 
theoretical and practical domains; and that very feeling that brings about an awareness 
of life can be felt and acted upon without the advancement of the will. Based on the 
introduction that Kant offers to his work on aesthetics and teleology, such an 
interpretation does not seem at odds with his intent. In fact, Kant’s Third Critique, if 
offered as an attempt to bridge the theoretical and practical domains, can do so through 
feelings of life. 
To demonstrate my central claim that a feeling of life is both vital to finding a 
place in the world for humanity and that this feeling can be achieved without an 
expansion of the will beyond its essential bounds will first require a brief explication of 
Kant’s determinate judgments, both theoretical and practical. This will allow a 
background by which we can compare reflective judgments and aptly show how 
aesthetic reflective judgments do not seek to determine that which appears, but can still 
make claims whose value extends beyond mere subjectivity. During this discussion, the 
importance of the orientation of the faculties will come to the foreground, in particular 
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the activities of the imagination. It will be shown that the faculty of the imagination 
plays a key role in differentiating between judgments whose focus is determinate 
knowledge and reflective judgments that, in free play, open possibilities rather than 
determine objects of experience. Once the imagination emerges as an important feature 
of this investigation, the path lies open for the introduction of aesthetic ideas, which 
expand our concepts and offer the possibility of reflection on the supersensible. Finally, 
with the play of the imagination and aesthetic ideas in hand, we can begin to explicate 
how a feeling of life can emerge from aesthetic experience and how this feeling does not 
require the advancement of the will. Further, it will be demonstrated that this feeling 
does not reduce humanity to simply one living thing amongst others. Rather, this feeling 
of life and our interaction with the phenomena is distinctly human; and, through it 
humanity expands its ability to assign value beyond determinate concepts and the 
mechanical laws of nature. Pointing back to the introduction of this project, the ultimate 
goal is to show how our awareness of life points to a harmony between our practical 
needs and nature by grounding our judgments in the vehicle of life, the human body. 
Kant’s critical philosophy is ultimately directed toward finding the boundaries of 
what humans can know by way of our faculties and guided by our interests. For 
example, the First Critique attempts to illustrate the line at which our theoretical 
interest, interest in the world of experience, must stop should we wish to avoid falling 
into hopeless contradictions. These boundaries, as is shown by Gilles Deleuze’s Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy, are the result of an underlying orientation of our distinctly human 
faculties: the understanding, reason, and the imagination. Briefly defined, the 
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imagination provides a schema, or a reading of nature, that, save for particular 
circumstances which will be enumerated later, assists the functions of either the 
understanding or reason. The understanding is our ability to take representations given 
through the schema and place them under concepts, to group empirically divergent 
appearances under overarching categories. Reason is the faculty by which humanity can 
think ideas that are beyond experience, freedom and God being two prime examples. 
What is important to note is that whether the interest is theoretical, practical, or the kind 
of disinterested interest found in aesthetic judgments, each interest represents a distinct 
orientation of our faculties, which then bears upon human interaction with what appears. 
Attending to these configurations then becomes a vital aspect of this investigation 
because appearance in the theoretical interest will be distinct from what ought to be in 
the practical sense, and these two determinations are dissimilar to the kind of ideas 
suggested by reflective judgment. Therefore, time will be given to clearly examine these 
orientations before any further discussion. 
 Beginning with the First Critique, then, we will use judgments of the 
speculative interest, which yield knowledge, as the starting point. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant points to an old, yet philosophically relevant, problem between pure 
concepts of the understanding and empirical intuitions, namely that “pure concepts of 
the understanding… can never be encountered in any intuition.”1 His concern here is no 
trifle; it is the possibility for application of the pure concepts of the understanding to our 
empirical apprehensions. Since the pure concepts of the understanding, as noted above, 
are not found in any empirical or sensible intuition, there must be some third thing 
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present in our dealings with the world in addition to our concepts and intuitions. Kant 
enumerates the role of this third player “which must stand in homogeneity with the 
category on one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the 
application of the former to the latter.”2 This third piece requisite for applying concept to 
intuition is what Kant will call the transcendental schema, which therefore introduces 
into this study the faculty of the imagination.  
We cannot think of the schema as a mere ordering of sense data into an image 
that we can then interpret and apply concepts of the understanding. That would be a vast 
understatement of the schema’s function and the role of the imagination in determinate 
judgments. Kant writes, “The schema is in itself always only a product of the 
imagination; but since the synthesis of [the imagination] has as its aim… only the unity 
in the determination of sensibility, the schema is to be distinguished from an image.”3 
Therefore, taking the synthesized manifold of intuition, the imagination, and only the 
imagination, schematizes, in which it takes the rules determined by these concepts and 
structures the particulars of our experience empirical objects to form a determinate 
nature that can be read, acting ultimately as a mediating force between the essentially 
inhomogeneous concepts and sensible intuitions. In short, according to Rudolf 
Makkreel, “The task of the imagination is to mediate between the conceptual 
universality and the empirical particularity of sensible intuition.”4 Here we see the basic 
structure of determinate judgments, with due interest in the role of the imagination as 
providing the schema and acting as a third player in the application of concepts to 
experience. 
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It might seem here that this is what we are looking for from the imagination in 
offering itself as a mediating power between what we bring to bear, namely the concepts 
of the understanding, with empirical objects. However, this would presuppose that the 
imagination can freely schematize without the legislation of the understanding lording 
over its activity, which is explicitly not the case. Left out from the above illustration is 
the feature of Kant’s transcendental philosophy that presupposes differing orientations 
of three faculties, namely understanding, reason, and imagination. Knowledge is 
legislative, in that within judgments of the speculative interest, a faculty legislates. In 
terms of the will, speculative interest demonstrates the understanding’s appropriation of 
not only the imagination, but of our access to empirical objects. We can see the will 
active in placing the appearance of nature under our own concepts, concepts that are not 
provided by the things themselves. In fact, in terms of the purely speculative interest 
there is no access we have to the things in nature without these concepts, making 
knowledge strictly determined before our full cognition of it. Deleuze, although not 
intentionally pointing to the kind of willfulness Heidegger sought to think through, 
offers some clarification on my point in stating that the understanding, “constitutes the 
laws to which all phenomena are subject from the point of view of their form.”5 These 
forms are concepts and are brought to bear on sensible intuition as a matter of fact in 
human cognition. While the imagination is the only faculty capable of schematization, of 
mediating between objective concepts and empirical objects, it only does so “only when 
the understanding presides, or has legislative power.”6 While the imagination 
schematizes, as it has been explained thus far has only been under the legislation of the 
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understanding, in which appropriates experience under a determinate concept in the 
service of knowledge.  
If theoretical interest is willful in that it subsumes empirical intuitions under 
concepts brought to experience by our distinctly human faculties, perhaps practical 
interest, whose interest cannot represent phenomena at all, can demonstrate a slowing of 
the will. Practical reason gives us ethical dictums that compel us to treat humanity as an 
end in itself, to not think of other humans in terms of their use. So far, this is promising 
in that it seems to stem our will’s inclination to reduce other rational beings; however, 
where pure reason presided over empirical intuitions, Deleuze states, “Practical reason 
legislates over the thing in itself.”7 There is still a faculty that applies its own laws to an 
external world, this time it is reason legislating over the noumenal realm. Unlike 
speculative reason, where the will stamps itself upon representations, practical reason 
represents an autonomous will that seeks to exemplify itself by bringing its laws to bear 
upon nature itself. The problem, however, is that nature appears to be guided by its own 
laws. Hence, the will’s need for free and rational beings to bring reason’s supersensible 
laws to the sensuous world. With contradictions looming, we can once again turn to a 
point made by Deleuze. He writes, “The practical interest is such that the relation of the 
representation to an object does not form a piece of knowledge, but designates 
something the be realized.”8 The will seeks to realize itself as a possibility in the 
sensible world and thereby drives the legislation of the laws of reason. As we can see 
with Kant’s ultimate illustration of the will, the ‘Kingdom of Ends,’ where all is in 
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accord with the will and nature’s influence upon humanity is brought to heel, marching 
lock step with reason’s lawfulness.  
As intriguing, and perhaps tantalizing, as this prospect may be, we may exploit 
the benefit of history to see why solving the problematic of the will requires stepping 
back to Kant’s critical system. Philosophers thinking after Kant took the will 
exemplifying itself in the practical interest and thought it through to its end, where the 
task of humanity was to bring the will as shown in the laws of practical reason to bear 
upon the natural world. This resulted in a primacy of the practical interest over our 
theoretical pursuits, where nature began to be for the sake of human law and eventually 
human value in accord with the will. As we will see in Chapter III, the terminus for this 
line of thought is Nietzsche’s final collapse of the divide between theoretical and 
practical interest, claiming that all meaning is practical and all values are determined in 
reference to human use. This is precisely what Heidegger sought to think through; 
therefore, we cannot turn to practical reason as a basis for thinking non-willingly. 
Keeping in mind the goal of showing how Kant’s critical philosophy can offer a 
non-willing orientation towards life, our faculties’ orientation in the speculative interest 
yields knowledge of the mechanics of life while practical interest leads to a primacy of 
the human will over nature. Knowledge, given in the first of these configurations brings 
forward an understanding of life that is subject to calculation and the demands of 
mechanical laws, since our encounter with living things in this manner would be 
schematized and subsumed under a concept of the understanding. Giving way to the 
will, however, results in the dominance of the practical over nature, which is no closer to 
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solving the problem than thinking in terms of mechanical nature. What theoretical and 
practical orientations have in common is that the imagination was under legislation by 
one of the other two faculties. Moving forward, then, we will see that subsuming the 
imagination under either the understanding in the speculative interest or reason in the 
practical interest are not the only ways the faculties can interact. What this implies is 
that not all human actions are guided by the legislative orientation of our faculties and 
we can exist in the world beyond mere determining judgments. The full description of 
such an existence is the next turn in this study. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, the role of the imagination as a mediating force 
was done only at the behest of the understanding, which applied the schemata provided 
by the imagination under a concept in the interest of knowledge. In the practical interest, 
we saw legislative reason as the will exemplifying itself in rational beings. Moving to 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the imagination is found to have a significantly 
different orientation toward the faculties of understanding and reason. Whereas in the 
First Critique the imagination was given the sole task of schematization, Kant suggests 
this new activity of the imagination by distinguishing its activity judgments of the 
beautiful when he writes, “No concept of any end for which the manifold should serve 
the given object… the imagination, which is as it were at play in the observation of the 
shape, would merely be restricted.”9 It is evident here that a very different relationship 
between the imagination and understanding exists in the judgments covered in the Third 
Critique, one that fits Kant’s above description in terms of play. Without the 
imagination subsumed under either the understanding or reason, we can look for an 
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orientation between the transcendental faculties that is not determinate in judging, but 
rather a free and harmonious accord between them. We can find this harmony in 
aesthetic judgments of which Kant notes, “no concept… can determine the judgment of 
taste, because it is an aesthetic judgment… which thus does not concern any concept.”10 
Recall that in judgments of knowledge, the understanding subsumed the imagination to 
apply an objective concept to the synthesized manifold. However, in judgments of the 
beautiful, the purposiveness is not objective, like an empirical aesthetic judgment where 
the object is pleasing to the senses; rather, it is subjective where the viewer delights in 
its existence, but such delight cannot be attributed to either our senses or some 
determinate property of the object. By finding no concept to attribute to our judgment of 
taste, the understanding finds itself unable to legislate a rule. Indeed, there is no law to 
be found at all making an experience of this kind something quite different from what 
we have discussed earlier. 
Encountering a situation where our powers of cognition, namely the imagination 
and understanding, cannot fall into their usual orientation and form cognitions excites in 
them something novel. Kant marks this distinction by saying, “The powers of cognition 
that are set into play by this representation are hereby in a free play, since no 
determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition.”11 By suggesting that 
there is an orientation of the faculties that does not result in determinate knowledge of 
nature or our practical duty, Kant is opening the way for something indeterminate, 
perhaps interpretation, in his critical system, but something that we feel rather than know 
in some determinate fashion. Free play suggests the possibility of more present in our 
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dealings with representations than the laws and concepts of the understanding can 
legislate. Otherwise, there would be no phenomena that slips free of all concepts of the 
understanding and unfetters the imagination in this manner. Moving forward, therefore, 
it will be key to keep in mind that thinking beyond the established bounds of reason and 
the understanding is brought about by feelings and not objective determinations. Hence, 
the turn to aesthetic judgments, which allow for reflection on these feelings, rather than 
reliance on simply our speculative and practical interest.  
The question may arise as to whether the kind of judgment just offered is really 
entirely different from determinate judgments of reason or the understanding. After all, 
it could be claimed that in aesthetic judgments, we simply trade one legislator for 
another; where understanding and reason has their legislative turn, now the imagination 
takes its seat at the top of the orientation and casts its laws down upon the other two 
faculties. However, to make such a claim is to fail to understand exactly what Kant 
means by an aesthetic judgment. He makes explicitly clear the determining ground for 
aesthetic judgments of taste when he writes, “Now if the determining ground of the 
judgment… is to be conceived of merely subjectively… it can be nothing other than the 
state of mind that is encountered.”12 The determining ground, then, for an aesthetic 
judgment of this kind is not any concept or law of the imagination, if such things could 
exist. Rather, it is a feeling produced by the activities of our faculties. This is key to 
removing the legislative aspect from our judgments that determines them for this or that 
purpose. Aesthetic judgments are indeterminate in that no law is applied and subjective 
in that their grounding is based on our feeling, rather than a property of the object. We 
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now see how these judgments are quite different from those described in the First 
Critique. A judgment of beauty, as stated by Deleuze, “does not represent an objective 
accord of the faculties… but a pure subjective harmony where imagination and 
understanding are exercised spontaneously, each on its own account.”13 Therefore, the 
suggestion that judgments of taste can be distinguished merely in terms of which faculty 
legislates is wholly incorrect. What we have is a radically different kind of judgment, 
whose key features are subjectivity and indeterminacy, key features that are owed to the 
unique free harmony that occurs between the faculties of representation, the imagination 
and the understanding. Harmonious and free play is what then leads Makkreel to claim, 
“The subjective agreement between the imagination and the understanding in an 
aesthetic judgment is not based on subordination of one to the other, but involves the 
free coordination and mutual play of the two faculties.”14 We will then continue to fully 
explore the results of this harmony in relation to the experience and feeling of life in the 
world.  
So, at the root of our feelings of aesthetic pleasure there is harmonious play 
between our faculties, which is not otherwise present in cognition. As its basis then, 
aesthetic pleasure and play rest on an accord between faculties. Kant claims as much in 
his description of pleasure in a judgment of taste as resulting from “a free play, since no 
determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition.”15 The understanding 
is unable to determine a concept; however, as we have noted, this is not to say that the 
imagination then moves to legislate over the understanding. Aesthetic judgments are 
subjective, based on feeling, and therefore cannot involve the use of objective laws. 
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Perhaps this contrast between the determining interaction and that of free play is best 
shown in Makkreel’s statement, “the play of the imagination and the understanding is 
one of ‘accord’ or ‘attunement.’”16 Contrast the depiction of a free accord with 
subjection under law and we begin to see the room which free play affords our 
judgments.  
However, the question remains as to how the accord or attunement of 
imagination and understanding can be enumerated and what these particular aspects of 
the imagination action in free play effect the freedom and indeterminacy of our 
judgments. Kant is clear on four distinguishing traits that shape aesthetic judgments of 
this type. First, “Taste is the faculty for judging and object or a kind of representation 
through a satisfaction…without any interest.”17 Earlier, it was noted how judgments of 
knowledge or morality subsume the activity of the imagination under their law. This 
configuration of the imagination under reason in practical judgments and the 
understanding in theoretical judgments was done in the practical and theoretical interest, 
respectively. Since judgments of taste are disinterested, we can claim that no such 
legislation occurs and the imagination is released into its own free and spontaneous play. 
Second, though judgments of taste are said to please universally, and are therefore not 
claims of mere sensuous pleasure, “The universality of the satisfaction is 
represented…only as subjective.”18 This claim upon judgments of taste, in addition to 
Kant’s third statement on them, that “no concept of the good, can determine the 
judgment of taste,” show that the purposiveness of the beautiful cannot be directed at an 
object, or a particular property within the object.19 In making a judgment of taste, then, 
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we make no claim upon the object in the world, but rather about ourselves in terms of 
the pleasure we feel in the form of imagination’s free play. The fourth demand of 
subjective validity indicates that pleasure is not merely individual to the subject, but 
points to a larger union between subjects. This unifying aspect of aesthetic judgment is 
something all subjects share – involvement in human life – and point humanity toward a 
special way of reflecting upon being alive. 
Exactly why feelings of life are a consequence of free and spontaneous play 
between the imagination and the understanding goes back to the functions of each 
faculty. Recall that in judgments of the speculative interest, the imagination acted as a 
mediator between sensuous experience and the concepts through schematization. Under 
the legislation of the understanding, the imagination seeks to give the concepts an 
objective meaning. As Makkreel explains, “the schemata realize the categorical forms 
by anticipating possible objects of experience while at the same time they restrict them 
by selecting what type of empirical concepts are eligible to be applied to such objects.”20 
Using this as a template, we can then take this set of actions and apply them in the light 
of free play. What is lost in reflective judgments is the definite category by which to 
apply to the object of experience. In the First Critique, the imagination would apply a 
concept and provide a reading of the experience for our speculative interest, or in the 
interest of knowledge. Now, however, there is no concept to provide a determined 
reading and no interest to which that reading must submit. The imagination in aesthetic 
judgments, because of its freedom from concepts is able to play with the possibilities 
that would otherwise be cast off in providing a reading for the theoretical and practical 
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interest. But, because the imagination is not itself capable of forming its own laws, it 
still conforms to the laws of the understanding, but does so without being subsumed by 
the understanding. Therefore, “the ‘free conformity’ of the aesthetic imagination to the 
laws of the understanding means that the imagination may not violate the categorical 
framework of the understanding, although it may explicate possibilities left open by that 
framework.”21 Here we have an illustration of free play where the understanding 
provides the rules of engagement between ourselves and the objects that slip from 
determinate cognition. The understanding offers a horizon of what could possibly 
appear, but there is no guarantee what will appear within the bounds of reality. Pleasure, 
then, is our imagination playing within these bounds and what is revealed may surprise 
us or instill a sense of wonderment. No matter the outcome, for outcomes are exactly 
what do not matter in these events, what is expressed is beyond the mere object of 
experience. As Makkreel notes, “This abundance of undeveloped material associated 
with a concept is the intuitive content that can no longer be subsumed under the 
concept,” a statement that indicates there is content beyond our pure empirical 
existence.22 These expressions that transcend the empirical object and are at play for the 
imagination are aesthetic ideas, an abundance of meaning that cannot be captured by 
normal, empirical cognition. 
Looking as life beyond the mechanism given by nature, we see imagination’s 
free play capable of moving our conception of life away from the merely mechanical 
processes that are revealed in determinate judgments of nature. Reflection on 
transcendental ideas distinguishes our encounter with feelings of life from knowledge of 
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life in that we can, and indeed ought to, look beyond simply the actions and mechanics 
of our own lives to feel enlivened. The spontaneous play of the imagination and 
understanding open new corridors by which the human in the world can experience life. 
This is done because aesthetic judgments, as it has been demonstrated, are not based on 
an objective property of the represented object, but our own feelings produced in our 
interactions with it. Furthermore, because no concept or law can be applied to the object 
of aesthetic taste, we are left to reflect on and not determine the purpose of the beautiful 
thing itself. Therefore, to utilize a particularly Kantian example, even though the purely 
mechanical processes of crystalline formations has objectively nothing to do with human 
experience on earth, its simple existence as something beautiful to be encountered 
suggests that there is more to it than that which can be determined by our speculative 
investigations. The ‘more’ here is suggestive of aesthetic ideas because the ‘more’ must 
come from a part of our existence that transcends sense.   
Life beyond mechanism is an aesthetic idea; however, Kant introduces aesthetic 
ideas as suggestive of a way between the practical and theoretical domains. If feelings of 
life beyond natural laws can be thought with this goal in mind, it is important then to see 
how aesthetic ideas in general are to serve as bridge. Beginning with the phenomenology 
of aesthetic ideas, Kant states that an aesthetic idea is a “representation of the 
imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any 
determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it… or can make intelligible.”23 
What is immediately striking about the experience that brings about our thought of 
aesthetic ideas is that it causes us to think, but not at all in a manner that displays any 
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kind of speculative interest. The feeling of free play that causes reflection on aesthetic 
ideas simply halts our cognition of the world, leaving only an abundance of thought for 
the human to indeterminately hold. This reflective hold that the aesthetic ideas have on 
us is a result of the indeterminate free play of the imagination. Now, not only can we 
envision the play of the transcendental faculties in reflective judgments, but also the 
thoughtfulness carried in aesthetic ideas and their effect on human experience offers a 
phenomenological weight to Kantian aesthetics, a tug that Kant himself must have been 
aware. The play of faculties as lively experience by way of aesthetic ideas suggests that 
the ideas of reason can be brought down from on high and allowed into worldly human 
life without antimony.  
However, Kant is not so eager to unfetter our aesthetic experience from objective 
concepts either. Rather than offer aesthetic ideas as something completely separate from 
objective concepts, Kant’s aesthetics remains coherent in terms of his whole critical 
system by keeping the apparently divergent fields of cognition and ideas that, by 
definition, are not suitable to any experience in relation to each other. Evidence of the 
holistic system can be found in that Kant makes explicit that the imagination, which 
supplies aesthetic ideas, is not a creative power unto itself. In short, no matter how much 
thought is occasioned by reflective judgments, there is no creation ex nihilo. Instead, as 
Makkreel points out, “the imagination is still seen to be working with the material 
supplied by nature.”24 The imagination, no matter its power, is still reliant on the senses 
for the material of its activities. However, instead of determining the sense material in 
terms of a definite concept, the spontaneous imagination and aesthetic ideas occasion the 
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play of possibilities within the bounds of that material. Therefore, we can see aesthetic 
ideas as not a creative force within the worldly human, but rather as a transformative 
force in the face of the over abundance of meaning.11 
The transformative aspect of the imagination, indelibly linked to the concepts of 
the understanding,12 can now be seen in their effect upon our transcendental concepts. 
Because aesthetic ideas express not a concept, but the possible content of an experience 
beyond the concept, they occasion the chance for us to compare the concepts of our 
understanding. Symbolism is the most obvious occurrence of comparing two concepts 
whose cognitive content are not related. Using an example from the Third Critique, we 
can look at the instance of Jupiter symbolized as an eagle carrying a lightening bolt. The 
concepts of eagle or lightening, in their objective content, have no relation with the idea 
of a god; however, looking beyond objective content allows us to reflect on the aesthetic 
attributes of the eagle and lightening bolt to draw a comparison between them as objects 
of experience and the essentially non-empirical god. Here appears a two-fold aspect of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  In	  Imagination	  and	  Interpretation	  in	  Kant,	  Makkreel	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  creative	  and	  transformative	  capabilities	  by	  contrasting	  Urbildung	  and	  Umbildung.	  
Urbildung	  would	  be	  the	  purely	  novel	  use	  of	  the	  imagination	  that	  Kant	  is	  trying	  to	  avoid	  attributing	  to	  the	  power	  of	  the	  genius.	  Kant’s	  own	  use	  of	  transformation	  (bildung	  um)	  further	  supports	  Makkreel’s	  point	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  imagination	  in	  aesthetic	  experience	  is	  transformative,	  which	  counters	  charges	  that	  the	  Third	  
Critique	  is	  not	  coherent	  in	  terms	  of	  Kant’s	  overall	  critical	  work.	  12	  Ultimately,	  the	  question	  is	  settled	  by	  Kant’s	  elevation	  of	  communicability	  over	  the	  work	  of	  the	  genius.	  The	  work	  of	  the	  imagination	  with	  aesthetic	  ideas	  must	  have	  sense	  experience	  as	  its	  material,	  the	  use	  of	  aesthetic	  ideas	  that	  lies	  closest	  to	  the	  understanding	  must	  be	  praised	  over	  those	  that	  seek	  to	  deceive	  it.	  Play	  of	  the	  imagination	  under	  free	  conformity	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  understanding	  is	  the	  standard	  for	  artistic	  pursuits	  since	  it	  is	  neither	  determined	  nor	  completely	  cast	  off	  from	  our	  faculties	  of	  representation.	  If	  ex	  nihilo	  creativity	  can	  be	  done	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  understanding	  at	  all,	  would	  require	  deception	  to	  form	  something	  completely	  new.	  
	  	   67	  
the transformative powers of aesthetic ideas. One, as seen with the case of symbolism, 
humanity is able to stretch concepts beyond objectivity through reflection.  
Although, in addition to the extension, aesthetic ideas, to use Makkreel’s words, 
“are suggestive in a way that shows the limits of these concepts.”25 Aesthetic ideas are 
an occasion for the human in the world to reflect upon intuitive content that goes beyond 
the concepts of the understanding. Understanding, then, is unable itself to provide 
concepts capable of encompassing all of our worldly experience. This is the vital role of 
aesthetic ideas in demonstrating more for life than simply the mechanical processes of 
nature. Our feeling of human life with a place in the world cannot be found simply in the 
concepts of the understanding. Rather, the role aesthetic ideas play is “to enliven what 
would otherwise be abstract rational ideas, i.e., make them meaningful in relation to 
experience.”26 Recall that the imagination, whether functioning in determinate or 
indeterminate judgments, always provides a reading of experience. What we are seeking 
in this investigation is a reading of experience that offers humanity a place in the world 
that is not mechanistic, but life affirming. Our concepts of the understanding, we have 
seen, are not up to the task of providing a reading that goes beyond theoretical nature. 
Humanity’s hope for human life in the natural order then must be transcendent of nature. 
Indeed this is what Kant was trying to find in his moral project; and, it was this desire 
that brought about the Third Critique as an attempt to show how the moral realm can be 
brought to that of theoretical nature. Reflective judgments give us access to signs or 
hints, given via aesthetic ideas, that there is a side of humanity that transcends the 
mechanism of nature. But, it must be kept in mind that it is in nature itself that we find 
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occasions to access to these ideas. Therefore, the human cannot be severed from nature, 
even though our existence in the world contains something beyond its realm. Human life 
then requires we understand this tension between nature and our supersensible pull, and 
seek out its harmony in order to do as Kant intended and provide a bridge between the 
natural and practical realms. 
Feeling enlivened is how we become aware of this tense harmony between 
nature and the supersensible because it both affirms our being part of nature and having 
access to something beyond experience. However, discussing pleasure and using our 
feeling of it as an anchor for humanity in the world is problematic simply because there 
are many ways we can receive this feeling, each with its own ground.13 The most 
obvious is sensuous pleasure, or the kind of gratification that humanity, as member of 
the animal kingdom, shares with other animals. While this is certainly subjective, it 
cannot be claimed as disinterested; and therefore, it is not free. On the other hand, 
satisfaction in the good is not a pleasure that is in the relationship of subject to object; 
rather, it involves the comparison of object to object. Pleasures of this kind are neither 
subjective as they are based on an objective concept, nor are they disinterested since the 
object’s existence is required for its relation to occur among other objects. Rodolphe 
Gasché notes the particular nature of pleasures that are both disinterested and 
indeterminate in that they are “not merely an effect – an aesthetic manifestation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Zeldin’s	  essay,	  “Pleasure,	  Life,	  and	  Mother-­‐Wit”	  provides	  clear	  distinctions	  of	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  possible	  pleasure	  in	  Kant’s	  critical	  philosophy.	  Though	  there	  is	  one	  immediate	  divide,	  namely	  between	  aesthetic	  and	  intellectual	  (rational)	  pleasure,	  Zeldin	  further	  subdivides	  them	  into	  four	  distinct	  forms	  of	  pleasure:	  two	  forms	  of	  aesthetic	  pleasure	  (gratification	  and	  formal	  pleasure)	  and	  two	  intellectual	  pleasures	  (formal-­‐intellectual	  satisfaction	  and	  moral).	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awareness – it is intimately tied up with taste as a state of mind in which powers freely 
become attuned to one another…as pleasure itself.”27 With this said, it can be seen that 
the pleasure is the free and harmonious attunement of our faculties, the very kind of play 
that suggests aesthetic ideas.  
The final explication of the feeling of life that can bring awareness of human 
existence that is both beyond mechanism and yet still within nature relies on the pleasure 
that is both subjective, but in free conformity with the laws – that our finite, contingent, 
and corporeal human life in the world can freely conform to the moral law. Pleasure 
offers a glimpse that these two realms are connected in a meaningful way for humanity, 
in both the pleasure of the beautiful for a given particular, or the negative pleasure in the 
sublime. Our awareness of existence beyond mechanical laws is occasioned by the 
faculties’ harmonious accord without interest or concept. Therefore, the pleasure felt in 
our bodies resulting from this free play is not linked to anything sensuous or objective, 
rather our own mental movements, which, as we have discussed, are involved with 
providing a sensible interpretation of the ideas of reason, are the cause of the feeling of 
life we experience. Keeping in mind that the goal of the Third Critique is to find a way 
of feeling that the practical realm impacts the realm of theoretical nature, the site of this 
glimpsed awareness is the human body, alive in the world. Thus, to use Mary-Barbara 
Zeldin’s phrasing, we “can have no pleasure, no feeling of life, unless the mind is related 
to bodily organs”.28 Any attempt to draw a feeling of life from our experience can only 
be done with due respect to our embodied state; otherwise, as stated by Kant, “life 
without the feeling of the corporeal organ is merely consciousness of one’s existence, 
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but not a feeling of well- or ill-being, i.e., the promotion or inhibition of the powers of 
life.”29 Our relation to life is aesthetic, essentially tied to feeling. Consciousness of our 
existence does not satisfy reason’s need to find sensible suggestions of the supersensible 
in empirical experience. Consciousness of existence is nothing other than awareness of 
what we are empirically, a body existing in nature that is subject to mechanical laws. It 
is by way of the living human body in the world that the feeling of life makes possible 
the demands of reason that nature has a place for humanity not merely as a cog, so to 
speak, but as an end in itself. 
One more objection arises with this reading of life in the Third Critique. Our 
pleasure, recall, must be disinterested; however, it seems as though our feeling of life is 
necessarily interested in the advancement of our own lives. Perhaps with a little added 
nuance the objection can be tempered to meet Kant’s criteria. Aesthetic judgments 
heighten the viewer’s awareness of their own life by suggesting that their existence 
transcends the merely mechanical and affords them the chance to find a place in the 
world without sacrificing the needs of reason. This phenomenon says nothing about the 
object that brought about the feeling of a fullness of life. Makkreel points to this feature 
when he writes, “While the disinterestedness of aesthetic pleasure involves an 
indifference to the existence of the object judged, it does not require me…to be 
indifferent to my own existence.”30 Human existence, viewed aesthetically as part of 
living nature, cannot be fully placed under any concept. Thus, we are not interested in 
anything that has empirical objectivity. Instead, we are moved by an idea of reason 
suggested by our feelings and receptivity to the supersensible. This clarification can also 
	  	   71	  
explain why our feeling of the furtherance of life cannot be reduced to mere biological 
survival. The continuance of our body and species is determinate and guided by the laws 
of nature. More pointedly, such a vocation for humanity does not offer an existence 
beyond the machine of nature. Rather, to clarify and dissolve the above objection, I 
suggest that our feeling of life is not one interested in its animal continuance, but in its 
distinctly human enrichment. Such a reading makes our feelings of life disinterested in 
the object, because we are looking toward our own fulfillment as humans, but it also 
keeps the judgment indeterminate since there is no law for the enrichment of life. 
It has been my goal in Chapter III to offer a reading of Kant’s Third Critique that 
answers the question of life left to us after disclosing problem of human value in the 
modern age. We are justified in using our faculty of reflective judgment to glean a view 
of human life that is not restricted merely to the laws of nature, which is all we would be 
offered in the theoretical interest. However, our reading of life is not simply generated 
ex nihilo, since even the free and harmonious play of our understanding is still subject to 
sensuous experience, thereby tying the aesthetic ideas that offer hints of reason 
impacting the natural world to the human body. Such a restriction is not to our detriment 
though, since we become aware of our supersensible faculties through pleasure in the 
beautiful and the negative pleasure of the sublime. Without the human body, we would 
only be capable of knowing that we exist, but find no delight in that fact. In short, the 
human body provides the opportunity for ideas of reason to make themselves visible as 
hints in nature, signs that are left for humanity to find in our encounters within the 
world. These signs as attributed to ideas of reason, which cannot without the aid of 
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human feelings have any sensible content, help in crossing the gulf that Kant indicates at 
the end of his critical system. Human life and our inherent interest in it provide the 
faculties for reading the ciphers of nature and allow us to make meaningful connections 
between the theoretical and practical realms – connections that eluded any form of 
determinate judgment, and left humanity severed from both nature and their practical 
vocation. 
An awareness of life that does not determine nature in terms of our will but one 
that rather seeks to unify our inclinations toward the supersensible and undeniable 
existence as part of nature is what I wish to carry forward from this chapter. Aesthetic 
judgments, as offered by Kant’s Third Critique, offer a smaller and more essential 
human will, one that is grounded in essential aspects of human existence rather than 
conditions of the modern age. Aesthetic judgments still contain interest, desire, and the 
capacity to think in terms of value; therefore, these judgments hold residues of the will. 
What will be vital in the next phase of this investigation is showing how this residual 
willing found in Kantian aesthetics is not only compatible with Heidegger’s conception 
of Gelassenheit, but how it also allows for a more complete picture of human existence 
beyond the modern age. Should it find a place next to Gelassenheit’s releasement toward 
death, aesthetic feelings of life and its enrichment will allow for human value and 
meaning assignment to continue even after the expansive, technological will has been 
thought to its completion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	  trans.	  Paul	  Guyer	  and	  Allen	  Wood	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	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CHAPTER IV 
LEBENSGELASSENHEIT AND THE UR-WILL 
Up to this point in the investigation we have been able to trace Heidegger’s work 
on the will following his initial disavowal of modern metaphysics in an attempt to find a 
more original way of being, namely one that allows things to appear undetermined by 
the will and modern technology. This more original way of being involves humanity 
twisting free from, yet not actively overcoming, our modern technological worldview 
that seeks to en-frame all beings in terms of their ability to be stored and used at the 
command of the modern subject. Although it has already been discussed, it is worth 
mentioning again that humanity, even when given over to rampant forgetfulness of the 
things themselves for the sake of their storage and use, cannot be completely 
appropriated by technology. This emphasizes the uniqueness of the human position as 
the only being capable of disclosing the being of beings. To put it briefly, humans are 
always at the site of the discovery of being. Humanity’s essence in this respect fends off 
the inclination toward pessimism given Heidegger’s bleak diagnosis of the age; in fact, 
Heidegger himself, even while claiming our epoch to be one of extreme forgetfulness of 
our own essence as the place where being is disclosed, holds that a move towards 
rehabilitation remains possible. Gelassenheit, existing neither passively nor actively, is 
the proper comportment towards things in the absence of meaning left after rejecting 
modern metaphysics in which humankind faces its own nonexistence, or its death. This 
move towards Gelassenheit is for Heidegger the ‘new beginning’ that will bring 
humanity back into accord with the things themselves.  
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As promising as this may sound we have seen that there are important questions 
that remain unanswered by the thoughts of later Heidegger. The question of particular 
concern relates back to the key focus point of this investigation – the relationship 
between humanity and nature in terms of value and meaning. Heidegger is ultimately 
unclear on the role we, as humans within the world, play in creating, holding, and finally 
discarding values attributed to beings we encounter. To aid in contending with this 
unanswered question, I brought forward aesthetic ideas as conceived by Kant in the 
Third Critique. Kant’s aesthetics represents an indeterminate and non-conceptual 
manner in which the human in the world can interact and decipher meaning from nature 
without subjugating it to willful ordering or manipulation. Furthermore, while 
Gelassenheit in Heidegger’s later thought is approached from humanity’s encounter with 
our own death, the phenomenology of beauty as laid out by Kant focuses on feelings of 
liveliness and human invigoration. And so we have laid out the pieces of the 
fundamental (dis)attunement characteristic of our age as diagnosed by Heidegger, which 
he sought to realign in a ‘new beginning’ for humanity. At one pole there are the things 
themselves as encountered in nature, with which we are to engage, but whose meaning 
we are not to anticipate or cling. On the other end there is living humanity who 
essentially interacts with the things at the site of meaning and is also essentially forgetful 
of the original event of meaning giving. Any harmony to be struck between these poles 
will require accommodating both, yet never one to the detriment of the other.  
Showing how life as seen from Kant’s aesthetics provides an answer to the 
problem of human meaning and value left in the wake of Gelassenheit will require 
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revisiting the tradition beyond which Heidegger sought to think, namely one with firm 
roots in both Platonism and Nietzsche. Doing this will not only shed light upon why 
Heidegger missed the opportunity to utilize Kant’s critical framework, in particular the 
features expressed in the Third Critique, but it will also fully reveal that the question of 
amenability and the accord between humanity and nature is one to be solved by looking 
at Heidegger’s conception of the relation between art and truth. With the arena set up in 
such a manner, it will be possible to glimpse the problems of the will that remain even 
beyond the rejection of the will to power which stand in the way of fully illustrating the 
role of humanity comported with Gelassenheit. Only then can the previous enumeration 
of Kant’s aesthetics come to the fore as a viable solution to our stated questions of 
finding meaning and harmony for humanity without the modern will. By the end of this 
chapter, it will be shown that the kind of accord that Heidegger looked for as a way to 
realign the (dis)attunement he saw in the modern era can be more fully depicted through 
the addition of indeterminate conceptions and invigorating feelings of Kantian aesthetics 
in relation to human interest in life set in relation to anxiety towards death in the face of 
our existential nonexistence. This harmony, which I will name Lebensgelassenheit, will 
adequately illustrate both the living aspect of human existence and the letting-be that 
humanity must achieve to free itself from the technological will. 
Understanding why Heidegger perhaps could have, but ultimately did not, look 
to nonpurposive conceptual indeterminacy as an avenue to fully illustrate Gelassenheit 
has its roots deep in the tradition out of which he thought and hoped to think to its end, 
namely ‘western metaphysics.’ The boundary markers of such an amorphous 
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designation are naturally thorny and wrought with contention, but it suffices for this 
study to name where Heidegger figured them to be, since this sheds light on the tradition 
from which he thought himself to be twisting free. Heidegger makes it clear where 
western metaphysics ends by naming Nietzsche the last metaphysician with the claim 
that all metaphysics is will to power.14 Therefore, if we are to gain any insight as to the 
concerns that Heidegger himself may have had when attempting to formulate 
Gelassenheit, we will have to start at the end of metaphysics and its stance on life, art, 
and the accord between humanity and nature. As a launching point for further 
questioning into the tradition Heidegger sought to think through, let us look at a line 
penned by Nietzsche. It reads, “Very early in my life I took the question of the relation 
of art to truth seriously: and even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this 
discordance.”15 Western metaphysics at its end implies a discord between art and truth, 
one that apparently is enough to bring dread to anyone who takes it seriously. This is a 
significant statement in a number of ways. First, it clearly designates a noteworthy 
relationship between art and truth; rather than holding the two separate as distinct 
activities or means of comportment, they are held in necessary relation. Second, it ties 
this relationship back to the feeling of dread discussed earlier, which, as you may recall, 
is the feeling that leads to technological will to will and ultimately the ‘new beginning,’ 
as envisioned by Heidegger.  
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Third, and perhaps most important for this investigation, is the claim that the 
relation between art and truth is one of discord. Allow me to take a moment and address 
a concern that may come to mind. Discord appears to be the opposite of accord. How 
then could a discordant relationship be helpful to our task of finding a harmonious place 
for humanity with nature? Simply put, discord and accord hold a far more essential 
relationship to each other than one of mere opposites. Heidegger also picks up on this 
difference when speaking of distance and discordance. He writes, “Discordance is the 
opening of a gap between two things that are severed.”1 Certainly this does not mean 
that all distance is discord, as in there is no discord between the pens and books on my 
desk even though there is space between them. Rather, the important concept in the 
above description is severance, implying that where there was once unity or a form of 
being-togetherness, there is now a gap. Heidegger pushes this idea further when he 
states, “opposition springs from the divergence of what once converged…precisely by 
being apart they enter into the supreme of belonging together.”2 So discordance is 
neither simply space not is it a breaking apart of two things that were previously 
together. We would not say that a river has somehow sown discord by coursing between 
two hills. Instead, discord has the essential trait of revealing through separation and 
holding apart what was once together. With this in mind, it takes only a little thought to 
see how remarkably close discord and accord actually are in their essence. Nothing can 
be in accord with itself, nor can anything have discordance with itself. Such claims seem 
odd, or at the very least in need of clarification, which usually reveals a hidden duality. 
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Both accord and discord therefore hold related things at a distance; and, through this 
distance there is revelation.  
One other important attribute of discordant and accordant relationships needs to 
be mentioned before further examination of art and truth can begin. Neither accord nor 
discord can occur when one side is subjugated or subordinated under the other. 
Heidegger picks up on this facet of the relationship when he states, “any two things that 
are supposed to be able to enter into discordance must be balanced against one another, 
be… of the same necessity and rank.”3 Since we are looking to use Heidegger’s 
conception of Gelassenheit as a framework for a more complete accord between 
humanity and nature, this is a vital distinction to keep in mind. Any solution that is 
offered in response to the human role of value assignment in Gelassenheit must not be 
founded upon distinctions such as ‘above’ or ‘below,’ or any other tiered relationship 
that can be conceived. That is precisely what the ‘new beginning’ is trying to shed. 
Instead, the goal must be to bring the discord that Heidegger saw at the end of 
metaphysics into a harmonious relationship.  
The qualities that make a relationship either discordant or accordant will come 
into play later in this chapter; however, it was necessary to set them out before hand in 
order to lay a clear path for inquiry. Returning to the particular discord with which 
Heidegger contended, the dreadful one Nietzsche saw between art and truth, it becomes 
clear that art and truth at the end of western metaphysics are more subtly related than 
previously thought. If they are in discord with each other, then the traditional conception 
of art as semblance of truth cannot be the entire story.  Art as mere earthly semblance 
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would place it as subordinate or ‘below’ truth, which would preclude their association 
from any kind of discord. We are left with the task of rethinking the relationship 
between art and truth – the discord that Heidegger will seek to bring into proper 
attunement by renouncing western metaphysics as the will to will. Fully explicating how 
this relation can be brought into harmony will require a clear view into what Heidegger 
takes art and truth to be at the end of metaphysics and how his interpretation of these 
ideas taken from Nietzsche will ultimately lead to the center of this investigation – the 
problem of life and human value beyond the modern will.  
It is important to note before looking further into the ideas of art, truth, and 
discord at the end of western metaphysics that this investigation’s scope is limited to 
Heidegger’s interpretation. This route was chosen because the reading of Nietzsche that 
Heidegger offers not only speaks to the problems that he sees himself in a position to 
solve; but also, the connections that Heidegger makes while thinking through the discord 
between art and truth impacts the solution at which he eventually arrives, Gelassenheit. 
More on this will certainly be said later; however, it was an important point to make 
before moving forward and picking through Heidegger’s thoughts on Nietzsche and 
western metaphysics as a whole.  
Discussing the relationship between art and truth first requires that we set up 
what we mean when we speak of art and when we speak of truth. More to the point, we 
need to determine what Heidegger took Nietzsche to mean when he spoke of the 
discordance that never ceased to fill him with dread. With the relation of art and truth in 
mind, Heidegger takes Nietzsche to be working on a traditional connection in 
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philosophy, one between semblance (art) and objective knowledge (truth). He writes, 
“the relation of art and truth that is here in question, the one which arouses dread, must 
be conceived as the relation of art and scientific knowledge, and correlatively the 
relation of beauty and truth.”4 Here we can hear echoes of Platonism with knowledge 
and truth related to something super-sensuous, beyond the reach of our human condition. 
Below that ascendant realm sits the world of sense, in which art must necessarily operate 
as a facsimile, or to use the Greek term mimesis. This, however, cannot be the kind of 
relationship that Heidegger sought to bring into accord because, as we have already 
seen, this is not a discordant relationship; rather, it is simply one of distance. Nor can 
Platonism simply be turned on its head, so to speak, to achieve the kind of discord that 
can then be thought to attunement. Were such an inversion executed, “the sensuous 
becomes being proper, i.e., the true, i.e., truth. The true is the sensuous.”5 However, 
Nietzsche is neither a positivist, nor does Heidegger make this claim. The point here is 
that reaching a clear view of the problem requires far more than a simple overturning of 
the tradition. Rather, Heidegger’s thoughts on Nietzsche’s work involve thinking 
something more fundamental to both art and truth.  
Looking to the first of the two discordant ideas, art, two important phrases can be 
taken from Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche. The first is in relation to value, wherein 
“art is the distinctive countermovement to nihilism.”6 Put in a manner that values brevity 
to the utmost, nihilism is the idea that all values are meaningless, which is not to be 
confused with the idea that all values are groundless. Since this investigation seeks to 
redeem life and human value beyond the modern will, any clear countermeasure against 
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nihilism is of immediate interest. If art is opposed to nihilism, then it must be engaged in 
value formation. Heidegger picks up on this essential feature of Nietzschean art and 
adapts the claim to his own lexicon when he writes, “art places the whole of Dasein in 
decision and keeps it there.”7 Being, because of an essential feature in art, is brought into 
question. A question of being is ultimately one of meaning and art opens the way for 
new values to be assigned. Notice, however, that art only brings beings into question, 
but does not answer, nor does it preserve answers. How then can simply an occasion for 
inquiry be the countermovement to nihilism? Simple, art makes nihilistic claims 
impossible. By occasioning the question of meaning, there then appears the possibility 
for value. With such possibilities at hand, there can be no claim that values are 
impossible. It is as Heidegger says, “the essence of the beautiful… makes possible the 
recovery and preservation of the view upon Being, which devolves from the most 
immediate fleeting appearances and which can easily vanish into oblivion.”8 Art and its 
related beauty permit reflection that is necessary for the kind of human value 
assignments that Nietzsche brings forward as a guard against nihilism in the absence of 
metaphysical value. Therefore, we can claim that art plays a central role in the formation 
of values in the metaphysics that Heidegger is trying to think through; and that is the 
reason we will keep our eyes on art as a possible solution to human meaning beyond 
Gelassenheit. 
Art, as Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche tell us, is the ground for the question of 
human value. It holds us in a place of decision; however, for human action in terms of 
values and meaning, the creation of value is only part of the picture. To shed some light 
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on what Heidegger claims a complete picture of value formation looks like for modern 
metaphysics, we can return to a quote from Davis’ work on the will. Davis writes, “the 
freedom of ek-sistence… is always complimented and countered by an in-sistence which 
holds fast to beings, turning its back on the opening which allows them to presence in 
the first place.”9 Art then is responsible for bringing humanity to the place where values 
can be made; however, once those values are assigned, humankind has a tendency to 
hold onto them, to insist, and forget the original occasion that made such a value 
possible. This occasion for creation and subsequent forgetting and holding-onto action 
makes up the value formation action that Heidegger describes in the work of Nietzsche. 
What remains then is to reveal what this existential holding-onto is for modern 
metaphysics. Answering that question is as simple as looking back to the discordance 
that since his youth had filled Nietzsche with dread, the discord between art and truth.  
Naturally, talk of truth in philosophy is a tangled web on the best of days; 
however, some explication as to what Heidegger means by truth in his Nietzsche 
lectures would be invaluable going forward. Looking to a few lines where Heidegger 
himself works through an explanation of truth, we can begin to see a few things about 
the second side of the discordant relationship. He poses the question, “What does ‘in 
truth’ mean here? Answer: what is in truth known.”10 Immediately the familiar link 
between truth and knowledge comes into play given Heidegger’s answer. Then, he goes 
on to further demonstrate this connection by adding, “The true is established as 
something true in, by, and for knowledge alone. Truth is proper to the realm of 
knowledge.”11 It is of no small help to remind ourselves that knowledge and truth, by 
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virtue of the relation onto which Heidegger will hold, in western metaphysics are given 
the venerable distinction as being what something is in actuality. Furthermore, as 
Heidegger notes, “the openedness of Being, truth, can only be nonsensuous illumination, 
since… Being is nonsensuous.”12 With such claims in mind, we can begin to move 
toward a more complete description of metaphysical truth as envisioned by Heidegger. 
If truth is what something is, and knowledge of such things belongs to an unchanging 
realm that transcends human sensuous existence, then truth, once grasped as knowledge, 
is incapable of change. A thing’s true Being cannot change in such a manner. To sum up 
truth in this manner Heidegger writes, “what is true… signifies what is re-presented as 
constant, what has been fixated as being.”13 Keeping in mind the essence of art in the 
twilight of modern metaphysics, the opening for the creation of value, not only does the 
role of truth become clear, but also the nature of its discord with art. Truth fixes values 
as metaphysical constants given over from being that is beyond human sense. Therefore, 
truth as knowledge of Being, allows humanity to grasp, hold onto, and finally carry 
meaning into all other interactions with the things, thereby affecting the structure of the 
world. 
Having laid out art and truth in their relation to human meaning and value 
assignment, how the two are in a discordant relationship comes into view. Rather than 
taking the traditional stance of truth overriding anything contrary that may be revealed 
by art, Heidegger’s Nietzsche places both the creation of value and the holding of those 
values on an equal metaphysical level. Both arrive at the site of the unfolding of being, 
art with the aim to occasion new meaning and truth with an arsenal of preserved 
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knowledge. Here is where the relation is most originary; and here is where art and truth 
come into a discordant opposition. Both have a claim to the assertion of value. Whether 
to create or preserve becomes the fundamental question of the relationship. Such a 
weighty question is brought into the light if we follow one more line of inquiry – the 
role of life in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche.  
According to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, art and truth are in discord at the 
site of value formation; however, given all of this discussion about values at the end of 
metaphysics, it would be well advised to clarify exactly what Heidegger takes Nietzsche 
to mean when he speaks of ‘value.’ Thankfully, and perhaps a little surprisingly, 
Heidegger is very forthcoming on the question. In his lectures on Nietzsche he states, 
“Value for Nietzsche means a condition of life, a condition of life’s being ‘alive’.”14 
Value then is indelibly linked to an essential feature of life, namely its being alive. 
However, it is important to note that the Nietzschean use of ‘alive’ is not to be taken in a 
biological sense, which would indicate something akin to all value being for the sake of 
our survival; instead, value plays a more nuanced role in conditioning life as suggested 
by Heidegger’s subsequent claim, “As a condition of life, value must therefore be 
thought as that which supports, furthers, and awakens the enhancement of life.”15 
Meanings formed by art and held by truth are not to be conceived as merely autonomous 
and competing functions of the subject. They are in fact directed in the service of life 
and its enhancement, not simple preservation.  
There does not appear to be any kind of discord if both art and truth are working 
in the service of life as providing and preserving values for its enhancement. Discord 
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arises when the human faces the world of things lacking inherent values of their own. 
Two familiar terms rise to the surface when speaking about encountering the things and 
having to form value from meaninglessness – chaos and schema. Chaos, we can recall 
from Chapter II, is the existential abyss that is encountered when values given over to us 
by morals, traditions, and the like are examined and fall away. Either values are then 
created as a ground or humanity is left to float in the inherent lack of meaning. Schema, 
on the other hand, takes the rules given to us by concepts and applies them to the 
sensuous data we encounter within the world and provides the human subject a 
decipherable reading. Or, as Heidegger points out, “Schematizing is discussed as 
imposing a certain measure of ‘regularity’ and certain ‘forms’.”16 Ultimately, it is a kind 
of mediator between concepts and our senses. This chaos is essential for Nietzsche, not 
to mention all existential philosophy. However, the problem materializes precisely 
because truth as knowledge demands a schema; otherwise, it could not hold onto 
meaning in the absence of any kind of regularity or form. Therefore, we are led to the 
discord in terms of life due to the practical need to schematize chaos. Heidegger writes, 
“Nietzsche’s view…implies at the same time the emergence of the abyss of ‘life,’ of 
life’s essential contradictions, not as…something to be negated, but as what is to be 
affirmed.”17 Knowledge cannot affirm contradictions, as evidenced by the most basic 
rules of our logic; however, life has a demand to affirm them. Yet, knowledge has 
become the primary arbiter of what is actual, despite being unable to answer to the 
demands that, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche claims of life. Art as the maker of 
value has no such difficulties, but is denied its place because of the emphasis on truth as 
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knowledge of the unchangeable and knowledge as fixed meaning. Thus, the discordant 
relationship that Heidegger sees Nietzsche diagnose, and a discord that has definite roots 
in the subjective will to will.  
With the evaluative roles of art and truth set out in such a manner and life 
defined in its capacity for enhancement, it becomes apparent as to why Heidegger, in his 
work on thinking through the technological modern will to will, saw the Nietzschean 
conception of life as something to be rejected. In it we see the two primary actions of the 
subjective will at work in the world. Art would be the reaching out and grasping of 
meaning, while truth as knowledge holds and solidifies meaning. Even with this in mind, 
it is not the goal of this study to suggest that either of these activities should be halted; 
rather, working through Heidegger’s thoughts on the ‘last metaphysician’ brings to the 
fore why he perhaps overlooked modern philosophies of life. After all, it is his stance 
that metaphysics led to this conception of life as enhancement that needs to be thought 
through should humanity hope to find a way back to non-technological thinking.  
Two relationships dealing with humanity and meaning seem to emerge at the 
forefront of our concerns with life, values, and non-willing. Imminently clear is the link 
between the worldly human and the encountered things. This is the supposed site of 
value formation and is worth thinking through once more given the previous elucidation 
on Heidegger’s views of the end of metaphysics. The second relationship, however, is 
subtler, and all the more important for that reason – the enduring pull that humanity feels 
toward the supersensible. In the face of modern metaphysics, Heidegger sought to 
reorient humanity in terms of our encounters with things in the world, finally offering 
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Gelassenheit as an attentive, yet non-expectant, way of comportment in which things 
could show themselves to us. Heidegger took supersensible truth, the kind endemic to 
western metaphysics, as seen from his lectures on Nietzsche, to be the source of 
knowledge calcification, the hardening of values as ‘truth.’ This calcification caused 
human values to become unresponsive to our dealings with the world; further, it forced 
the things-in-the-world to conform to our obdurate calculations. Modern technological 
thinking was only the natural move from such an orientation. Therefore, we can 
understand why Heidegger, to unyoke humanity from this kind of thinking, retreated 
from our attachment to the supersensible. However, this move, as sympathetic as we 
may find ourselves to be towards it, was heavy-handed in its treatment. Keep in mind 
that none of this is to call for a return to the supersensible as envisioned by Heidegger’s 
Nietzsche; rather, what is needed is a reorientation between humanity and the realm 
beyond our senses. Remarkably, however, this does not require any more of an overhaul 
of contemporary thought than what Heidegger himself trumpets in his later works. The 
necessary rehabilitation of humanity’s connection with the supersensible is, as I will 
now demonstrate, already available in Kant’s aesthetics. 
For Kant there are two spheres that lie outside of our empirical existence, making 
any claim of reorientation toward the supersensible a two-part project. First, there are 
the things themselves to which we have no experiential access, the objects of theoretical 
knowledge. Second, there is the supersensible in terms of our practical vocation, namely 
the ideas of freedom as offered by reason. As indicated in the Introduction to his Third 
Critique, Kant holds that text’s value to be in its ability to provide some way of 
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traversing the gap between the two realms that our experience cannot grasp. What Kant 
offers in Critique of the Power of Judgment is a double reconfiguration of the 
relationship between, on one hand, humanity and the things come across in nature, and a 
second realignment in terms of the connection between humans and our feelings of the 
supersensible. Both, are not only amicable to Heidegger’s goal of thinking through and 
ultimately twisting free from modern technological thinking, but also aid in the 
completion of a human place within the world beyond the will.  
Beginning with humanity and the things encountered in the world, it must be 
shown that the relationship given in Kantian aesthetics is not one where meaning is 
assigned to the object as ‘truth’ to be preserved in all future activities with that thing and 
things of its ilk. Such an interaction is obviously the kind that characterizes modern 
technological thinking and is therefore to be avoided. An immediate answer comes to 
mind as to how Kant’s aesthetic judgments avoid this particular designation. In the First 
Introduction of the Third Critique, Kant writes, “By the designation ‘aesthetic judgment 
about an object’… what is understood in the judgment is not the determination of the 
object but the subject and its feeling.”18 Aesthetic judgments make no truth claim upon 
the object; and thus, there is nothing onto which humanity can hold and carry beyond 
and into future experience. Instead, what the human has from a judgment of this kind is 
a feeling of pleasure in relation to that one, individual, object in the world. More 
important to human life is a feature of aesthetic pleasure enumerated by Makkreel. He 
explains, “Aesthetic pleasure heightens the sense of my existence, furthers my feeling of 
being alive, and is therefore significant. While… aesthetic pleasure involves an 
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indifference to the existence of the object judged, it does not require me, the judging 
subject, to be indifferent to my own existence.”19 Here, we see the emphasis shift from a 
true proposition about object to the life and enlivening feeling of the judging subject. 
What is carried forward after such an encounter is not knowledge of a property of the 
object, which Kant makes explicitly clear; instead, it is a feeling of invigoration that a 
human feels in relation to his or her own existence.  
There emerges no practical demand to schematize the feelings of life into 
something fixed and enduring, as Heidegger suggests of metaphysics in his Nietzsche 
lectures. Oddly enough, the only imperative that exists in aesthetic judgments is not 
between human and object, but between human and human, evidenced by Kant’s claim, 
“if he [or she] pronounces something is beautiful, then he [or she] expects the very same 
satisfaction of others.”20 Here we can first see the first reconfiguration that Kant’s 
aesthetics engenders, that the claims of aesthetic judgments are not truth claims imposed 
upon objects by a value-assigning subject. The individual crystal formation, to use 
Kant’s example, does not solidify in terms of value because nothing ‘true’ has been 
claimed about it itself. What there is, however, is an empirically disinterested encounter 
with an individual object, followed by a feeling of life’s quickening, and finally an 
imperative between humans themselves that can be carried forward from the experience.  
Before moving on, I would like to call to attention the claims made in the 
Nietzsche lectures in terms of schema and the role of the imagination in aesthetic 
judgments. Recall that truth as retainable knowledge of things demands order and 
stability be ‘stamped’ upon the ‘chaos,’ otherwise described as what we encounter or 
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what first comes forward in our dealings with the world. The action of knowledge 
leaving its stamp is given the evocative designation of ‘schematizing,’ and not without 
historic and conceptual consideration for that particular word. As offered by the Critique 
of Pure Reason, the faculty of imagination is responsible for schematizing, or providing 
a reading, of the empirical world that can then be brought under concepts. In judgments 
of either theoretical or practical interest, the imagination is subsumed under the 
understanding or reason respectively, allowing for legislation by the dominant faculty. 
Given the schematizing role of the imagination in Kant’s first two critiques, it is not 
surprising that Heidegger’s Nietzsche, collapsing the theoretical and practical divide 
altogether, will claim, “practical behavior, the praxis of life… is the attitude from which 
the knowing mode of behavior arises and is determined.”21 This claims imagination’s 
work of providing a schema for encountered things always serves the practical interest 
and is directed at bringing the ideas of reason into nature. Certainly there is an inherent 
argument here between Kant and Nietzsche over the collapse of the practical and 
theoretical divide which makes all interest practical in its aftermath; however, even in 
lieu of resolving such a debate, a rather critical point can be brought forward. Yes, only 
the imagination can provide a schema; but the imagination does not only schematize 
under the legislation of another faculty – it can also play. Deleuze’s piece on the 
faculties of critical philosophy tells us that in beautiful judgments there, “is an accord 
between the imagination as free and understanding as indeterminate.”22 There is then an 
alternative orientation between the schematizing imagination, reason, and understanding 
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that is not accounted for in Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche, the one brought forward 
in aesthetic judgments.  
Remarkably, for all the space given to the discussion of life at the twilight of 
modern metaphysics and the use of terms that are indicative to Kant’s critical 
philosophy, Kantian aesthetic judgments are not considered as a counter argument to the 
conception of life as will to power and ultimately will to will. It is not as though 
aesthetic pleasure and feelings of life are presented in a disjointed manner, as the two are 
indelibly linked in the Third Critique. Makkreel points emphasizes the bond between 
life and aesthetic feelings with his statements, “The play of the imagination in the 
judgment of beauty serves to intensify the activity of our mental life in general;” further, 
he writes, “Aesthetic harmony is the feeling of life at its purest.”23 Despite perhaps being 
overlooked, there can be little doubt as to the importance of aesthetic pleasure and the 
imagination to our feelings of human life. Yet, life, as taken by Heidegger at the end of 
western metaphysics, is the discordant creation of values through art and truth clinging 
to meaning through the stabilization of the encountered chaos. Heidegger, in thinking 
through this modern willing toward Gelassenheit, sees both the creation and holding of 
value as essential to the technological worldview.  
We have already seen how aesthetic judgments are different from claims of truth 
in that they are individual and do not demand other objects of its kind to conform to our 
claims. What then of art and its ability to pull new meaning from the chaos? Kant only 
discusses aesthetic imagination in terms of its creative power in the form of genius; 
however, the powers that Kant assigns to the genius are exceptionally limited. On the 
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source of the artist’s power to create value, Kant writes, “the author of a product that he 
owes to his genius does not know himself how the ideas for it came to him, and also 
does not have it in his power to think up such things at will or according to plan.”24 In 
short, genius’ creative power is limited to representing ideas given over by nature, 
thereby making the artist a cipher of value, far from a creator in the effect that Heidegger 
finds in Nietzsche. What this limitation shows is that the values gleaned from our 
reflections on beauty are not related to value in the ex nihilo manner suggested by the 
Nietzsche lectures. Instead, human values arising from beauty are the result of 
reflection. Makkreel describes the ideas that humanity gleans from reflective judgments 
of this kind, claiming that they are “not rigidly prescribed by reason but are adaptive to 
the content of their subject matter. They provide no a priori determinant rules for 
interpretation, but indeterminate guidelines.”25 Aesthetic pleasures that engender 
feelings that enliven humanity are tied to neither the radical creation of value nor the 
solidifying of meaning against the surge of chaos. Instead, human invigoration comes 
from reflection and the play of possibility when encountering beautiful objects. This is 
the reorientation between human and encountered object that the Third Critique offers. 
Human interest in life can be redefined in terms of our own imaginative reflective play 
with objects. Reconfiguring the interaction of humanity and things-in-the-world in this 
manner escapes the criticisms that Heidegger levies against modern technological 
willing and allows for the worldly human to still play a role in value-formation. Our 
relationship becomes one of possibilities that enliven interest in life and encourage 
	  	   94	  
humanity to interact with the world aesthetically, not in the interest of knowledge or 
securing ourselves against the chaos, but rather for the simple pleasure it evokes.  
The lively and imaginative play of possibilities that reflective judgments offer to 
humanity point to a more fundamental harmony that Heidegger views as discordant in 
our modern epoch. Here I speak of the simultaneous pull that humankind feels towards 
the sensible and the supersensible. In his lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger traces the 
history of western metaphysics under the arching theme of supersensible superiority in 
terms of truth; further, Heidegger formulates the end of metaphysics by diagramming 
Nietzsche’s reversal of this hierarchy, claiming that all metaphysical, or non-sensuous, 
value is derived from practical use in the sensible realm. It is a tidy picture to be sure; 
but the question remains as to whether or not the Kantian harmony, which places 
humanity between the unknowable things themselves and the supersensible ideas of 
reason, truly fits the broad Heideggerian description of western metaphysics. The Third 
Critique does contain Kant’s key statement that, “the latter [freedom as the 
supersensible] should have influence on the former [nature as sensible], namely the 
concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible 
world.”26 Although this claim appears to suggest a supersensible hegemony the like of 
which Heidegger wants to eventually reject in humanity’s ‘new beginning’ free from the 
will, upon closer analysis, the relation between the supersensible and nature can be 
harmonized in a way distinct from the tradition of willful western metaphysics.  
Pivotal to this harmonious reconfiguration is that the supersensible ideas of 
freedom do not connect with the human directed in speculative interest; or, to be clearer, 
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it is not the nature as a mechanism that opens itself to the influence of the ideas of 
reason. What the supersensible does come across is the reflective human who, because 
of the indeterminate play of the imagination, is capable of moving within possibilities, 
not simply establishing determinate knowledge. Here is the ultimate value of feelings of 
life stirring within the human, or Lebensgefühl. It is preparatory in that it allows for a 
new relationship with the supersensible that offers us a path away from entering into a 
discord with nature. Without Lebensgefühl, humanity is not prepared to enter into play 
with the supersensible, thereby running the risk of placing it above nature as the arbiter 
of truth, evident by a historic survey of metaphysics in the west. Angelica Nuzzo picks 
up on this foundational aspect to feelings of life in claims they, “make an experience of 
our belonging to living nature possible.”27 Notice how humanity, oriented in terms of 
Lebensgefühl is not simply part of mechanistic nature, but living nature. As Kant 
demonstrates in the Critique of Pure Reason, determinations between nature as 
mechanism and the supersensible are not possible. Living nature, however, opens such a 
dialogue. Nuzzo brings the full potential of this orientation to fruition when she writes, 
“The accordance between nature and freedom cannot be objectively known and does not 
need to be practically postulated. It is, instead simply and directly felt in the moment in 
which we gain a reflected feeling of ourselves as living part of nature.”28 There is no 
hierarchy between worlds established when humanity, stirred by the pleasure of being a 
member of living nature, enters into a dialogue with the supersensible realm. There are 
only feelings brought about through reflection on how ideas of reason can be present or 
represented in nature. No objective knowledge is grasped and held and there is no 
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practical use for such thoughts, as they cannot be determined. Humanity, in its new 
orientation toward ideas beyond the senses, feels its own place in living nature, suggests 
that it has a home here in the world, and can play with the things as they appear without 
demanding new metaphysical values, or adherence therein, from their emergence.  
Human feelings of liveliness result from the free and indeterminate play of 
imagination and understanding. This particular pleasure brings about a double 
reorientation for humanity, namely our dealings with things on one end and our relation 
with the supersensible on the other. Life through aesthetic pleasure encourages the 
worldly human to play with the possibilities that things in their emergence offer, where 
meaning is cultivated through engagement, not generated by human practical use or 
stamped upon the object itself. Play with possible meaning through reflective judgment, 
and encouraged by Lebensgefühl, is a way humanity can still participate in the disclosing 
of value without activating the modern will. Furthermore, feelings of life also represent 
a new orientation for humanity toward the supersensible. Rather than collapse the world 
beyond our senses as modern metaphysics, Kantian aesthetic experience suggests a way 
to move beyond the supremacy of the supersensible while still retaining a basic human 
instinct of value formation. Our awareness of life as connected to living nature, as more 
than simply a piece of mechanistic nature, prepares us to not only come into contact with 
the ideas of reason, but also to feel the possibility of those ideas having influence on the 
natural world in which we find ourselves. The danger is, as we have seen, to engage the 
ideas of reason in our practical interest and bring them to bear upon the encountered 
world. The human with Lebensgefühl, however, is oriented otherwise and capable of 
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thinking in terms of possibility, not simply determinate knowledge for the preservation 
of life against mechanistic nature.  
Values brought about by human orientation within the world are ultimately the 
primary focus of this investigation. In the way described above, human meaning takes 
on quite a different form from what was described by Heidegger in the Nietzsche 
Lectures. Feelings of life and humanity’s understandable interest in our own lives, far 
from the ex nihilo generative power or willful stamping Heidegger places at the end of 
metaphysics, are meant to signal a new harmony between humanity and the things and 
humanity and the supersensible. This new configuration points to the possibility that 
human interest in our own lives can not only remain in Gelassenheit, but plays a vital 
role in the exchange between human and thing-in-the-world. Therefore, aesthetic 
pleasure and feelings of Lebensgefühl, as set out by Kant in the Third Critique, help to 
provide a more complete picture of the human role in value formation in thinking 
beyond the will. Human meaning and value then rests on aesthetic experience; and, as a 
tenuous safeguard from a fall back into modern willing, humanity has its feelings of 
fullness of life.  
Feelings of life and its enrichment, therefore, offer the harmonious counter 
balance to the anxiety towards death that Heidegger sees as essential to human dealings 
within the world. However, where Heidegger saw the enhancement of life as the 
protective source of the modern technological worldview, the particular Kantian 
orientation that brings about interest in life is actually a step away from willful 
engagement in that it neither carries experience forward as knowledge, nor does it 
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demand supersensible coherence upon the sensible world, both of which Heidegger 
directly rejects in his diagnosis of modern thought. Play and possibility replaces the 
simultaneous active grasping and holding of the age that concerned Heidegger. There is 
active engagement with the emerging things in the form of play; but play in Kantian 
aesthetics does not promise continued adherence to what is discovered. It is individual in 
terms of the thing come across and indeterminate in relation to the supersensible realm. 
Therefore, the key components of the active, willing, modern subject are dissolved 
without expunging the possibility of humanity offering its own value from the 
encounter. 
The concluding paragraphs in chapter one of this project referenced Davis’ idea 
of the Ur-will, an a-historical, and essentially human component of the will that he 
indicated would remain even after the modern will had been thought through by way of 
Gelassenheit. Human interest towards life as it emerges in Kant’s aesthetics is what I 
would like to present as the Ur-will. Not only have feelings of Lebensgefühl been shown 
to avoid the criticisms of the modern will in terms of expansion and ossification of value 
by means of a double reconfiguration, but our own interest in life as something 
essentially human also passes the phenomenological test. We, as humans, in our 
everyday dealings, are the kind of beings who care about the kind of life we live. This 
claim is compelling in its utter obviousness. Further, while it may be possible to imagine 
a human existence that is not interested in its own life, we must ask the palpable 
question – would that be the kind of life we, as humans, would want? A 
noncontroversial answer to this question would be, ‘No, not if there is another way;’ and 
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that is precisely what this investigation brings to the discussion of humanity beyond the 
modern will, another way of thinking human life that can remain even beyond the 
modern age.  
A sketch of humanity under what I would like to call Lebensgelassenheit, living-
letting-be, can be offered as the concluding remarks to this work. Lebensgelassenheit 
has a two-fold connotation that points to the value of such an orientation. First, and more 
immanently clear, is the importance that feelings of life play in a more comprehensive 
view of Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, a view that now allows for human value to have a 
definite place beyond the technological will. Also though, the idea of living-letting-be 
suggests that such a way of being can be lived. The importance of this feature cannot be 
overstated. Heidegger offers a manner of comportment that directs us towards our 
inherent lack of metaphysical meaning and the ultimate possibility towards our own 
nonexistence, our inevitable death. However, how we are supposed to live in relation to 
human value is not clear even though fundamental play with meaning is part of what 
humans are essentially. The addition of living to letting-be harmoniously places the 
opposite poles of human interest toward meaning and letting the things show 
themselves. With this orientation the worldly human can engage playfully with the 
individual thing as it is encountered, while still respecting the thing’s individual 
emergence since no knowledge claims need to be carried forward from the interaction.  
But what of the danger presented by the Ur-will? After all, the will remains 
present at the site of engagement in the form of Lebensgefühl and it still retains its ability 
to impact the unfolding of the thing by way of human value formation. This cannot be 
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avoided and speaks on an even deeper level to the Heideggerian concept of accord. 
Recall that Heidegger indicated that the (dis)attunement between truth and art could only 
have resulted from a previous harmony that was knocked into discord. The harmonious 
relationship offered in Lebensgelassenheit holds the same risk of falling back into the 
(dis)attunement that brought about the technological worldview. All that can be offered 
is vigilance, an awareness of the attunement that allows humanity to think beyond the 
modern will and into harmonious accord between our feelings of life and the ultimate 
groundlessness of human existence. Such an accord can be forgotten and every venture 
into play, every wager, carries with it the possibility of loss. This admission, far from 
materializing as a complication, only strengthens the idea that Lebensgelassenheit, as 
based off of Kantian aesthetics, is amicable to the Heideggerian project. Where there is 
danger of falling back into the rampant will also resides salvation in the form of a tense 
harmony between anxiety towards death and metaphysical groundlessness on one side, 
while on the other side rests feelings of life and its enrichment that lead to harmonious 
and playful accord between things in their emergence and humanity in the world.	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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Finding a way to think through the problem of the will was a cornerstone of the 
Heideggerian project from as early as Being and Time, though Heidegger’s engagement 
with Nietzsche, and into his later thought that culminated with the idea of Gelassenheit. 
We have seen that willing as a human activity received an ambivalent treatment in Being 
and Time. On one hand, when Heidegger spelt out the method of phenomenology, there 
was an emphasis on letting the things show themselves to us, rather than the actions of 
the subject attaching meaning to whatever objects they might come across. However, the 
distinctions of presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand suggested that all worldhood and 
disclosiveness was based on human projects and our comportment in terms of care. 
Then, we saw Heidegger contend with Nietzsche, whom he called ‘the last 
metaphysician.’ Taking Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power to ultimately be simply a 
will to will, Heidegger’s project became to think through the modern conception of the 
will towards a ‘new beginning.’  
A major obstacle to that goal was the technological worldview that permeated 
western thinking to the point that most people could no longer notice its influence. The 
phenomenological analysis of technological thinking revealed an extreme forgetfulness 
of authentic disclosure between Dasein and the things themselves. This was a symptom 
of a greater problem for humanity stemming from an anxious awareness of the lack of 
meaning of human life. In short, the modern human was aware that there was no 
essential meaning or value present in our lives. Frightened, the modern subject would 
	  	   103	  
then act to protect itself by creating meaning through its encounters with objects and 
hold to those meanings as truths. The simultaneous creation of value and holding to truth 
as knowledge formed a technological grounding for our existence that was based on 
usefulness and expansive interest. Diagnosing the problem, Heidegger claimed that our 
technological thinking had already determined objects in terms of their use before we 
even encountered them. Fearful that such an orientation toward the world would lead, 
and indeed already had led, to the partial reduction of human life to mere ‘standing 
reserve,’ where humans were seen as resources and founts of energy to be harnessed for 
the next expansive project of the cybernetic world. 
Gelassenheit, an active letting-be, was for Heidegger to represent the new way of 
comportment, where the human was no longer being-against-objects but rather found a 
way of existing amongst the things themselves in a way that was not willful. Rather than 
force meaning upon things encountered in the world, humanity was to exist alongside 
them and not cling to whatever meaning was offered to us. Ultimately, this was to force 
humanity face our own lack of meaning and embrace our fate of nonexistence. Engaging 
the things in this manner was likened to a wager, since entering the abyss of meaning 
meant risking all values that we had up to this point stored away as truth. Gelassenheit 
represented for humanity a way of being beyond the modern will that put us in 
conversation with the things themselves and allowed for a more original relationship 
with the world. The question arose however, about the kind of lives humans were to live 
after Heidegger’s ‘new beginning.’ Distinctly human forms of value – culture, tradition, 
and customs – were not given a clear place in terms of Gelassenheit. While the 
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hermeneutic benefit of questioning such institutions was not in question, the concern 
was far broader and extended to perhaps the most essential of human activities. How 
was humanity to create their own meaning and find a place in the world in terms of 
Gelassenheit? To find an answer to this concern, the investigation turned to Kantian 
aesthetics as explained in the Third Critique. Focus centered on redeeming human 
values even after the modern, technological will had been disavowed. 
Looking to the particular orientations of the faculties, it was shown that the 
relation between the understanding and the imagination in free play offered an 
interesting opportunity to glimpse human judgment that was not legislative upon the 
world. As opposed to theoretical judgments where the will exerts influence upon nature 
in the form of providing a reading that is intelligible to human senses, or practical 
judgments where the will legislates upon itself, aesthetic judgments of the beautiful were 
found to be disinterested in terms of theoretical and practical demands and indeterminate 
in relation to conceptualizing experience. What this offered was an instance of free play, 
where the imagination and understanding enter into a suggestive, not legislative, 
relationship. Free play upon the emergence of beauty in nature provided the chance to 
not only expand our concepts when encountering nature, but also introduced pleasurable 
feelings of liveliness. These feelings were linked to the supersensible idea that humanity 
has a place in the world that transcends mere mechanistic nature. In short, while there 
can be no experiential evidence that humanity is more than a mere cog in the machine of 
the natural world, we can think as though we are by way of reflection upon beauty in 
nature.  
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An awareness of ourselves as part of living nature, rather than mechanistic 
nature, prepares humanity for a new relationship with nature and the supersensible. 
Invigorated by the pleasurable feelings of life’s fullness as part of living nature, 
humanity need not stand against nature and the emergent things themselves and dictate 
truths; instead, Lebensgefühl provides a place for humans of reflect on being part of the 
living natural world, thereby stunting the frightened need to create a ground out of 
anxiety towards death. The relation between human and thing in the world becomes one 
of possibility where no truth claim is carried forward into new engagements. All that is 
retained is a feeling of life’s enrichment and the idea of belonging to nature. Our relation 
to the supersensible was also shown to be reconfigured by means of lively play and the 
pleasure it stirs. In this way, Lebensgefühl was claimed to be preparatory for a non-
willing interaction with the ideas of reason. Rather than stamp rational ideas upon 
mechanistic nature, something that Kant denies is even possible, the human as a part of 
living nature facilitates the possibility of the two divergent realms interacting. There is 
no determinate evidence found that can be held as truth after such an encounter; rather, 
the human is left to reflect on the possibilities of the supersensible’s impact on the 
sensible world.  
This relationship between human, nature, and the supersensible realm was 
brought forward to illustrate a new way of being in the world that was not willful but 
still offered the possibility of human value even after Heidegger’s ‘new beginning.’ 
Humanity can still acquiesce to the tug that we feel toward the supersensible, but it can 
only do so with an understanding of its place in living nature. Value and meaning can be 
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suggested through this activity; however, because it is simply the play of possibility, 
there is no calcification of truth that can form an unnatural grounding in the abyss of 
meaning. Unless, of course, humanity forget once again their primal relationship with 
both nature and the supersensible is indeterminate and merely suggestive. This is the 
danger of the Ur-will that remains even after the supposed turn toward Gelassenheit. 
Vigilance and an awareness of the tense harmony this investigation has described is the 
only protection that can be offered to keep humanity from falling back into something 
akin to modern technicity. Despite the dangers of such an orientation, it has been shown 
that Kant’s aesthetics in terms of free play and the Lebensgefühl such an activity 
engenders, are not only amicable to the Heideggerian conception of Gelassenheit, but 
also helps to offer a more complete picture of how the human is supposed to live and 
participate in future evaluations of nature and the things themselves. I have offered the 
neologism Lebensgelassenheit to represent this full illustration because of its dual 
connotations. First, that life and human interest therein is essential to any existence, even 
those outside of the modern technological worldview. Second, that Lebensgefühl as a 
living-letting-be is capable of just that – being lived. It places feelings of life and anxiety 
toward death in a harmonious accord that allows for what is essentially human, namely 
our ability to find meaning and search for a place in the world, to continue beyond 
modern willing and into the ‘new beginning.’ 
Although this project provided answers in terms of what human activity might 
look like in light of Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, several points surfaced during the course 
of the investigation that I believe indicate further avenues for research on this topic. The 
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first has to do with the conception of the will and its place in modern thinking. 
Heidegger’s analysis of modern technicity and the will to will was used exclusively in 
this work. While the reasons for doing so are obvious given the scope of the project, it 
would be a worthwhile endeavor to look farther back into German Idealism to see the 
will as a faculty emerge into the philosophic corpus. Further, there was extensive 
discussion in this project on the relationship between Nietzsche and the will; however, 
all such conversation was seen through the lens of Heidegger’s interpretation. Looking 
to the will in German Idealism and then onward into Nietzsche would not only provide 
further historical grounding for the problematic of the will as worked through by 
Heidegger, but it would also strengthen the sentiment that Lebensgelassenheit offers a 
way of solving a rather engrained problem for philosophy.  
Second, an interesting thought arose out of Chapter IV of this work. I mentioned 
that the only imperative tied to reflective judgments was the one that occurred between 
humans in a community. Kant assigns intersubjective validity to judgments of beauty, 
meaning that every human can be expected to agree when one person claims that 
something is beautiful. The idea that an interpersonal demand avoids being willful in 
that it shifts the responsibility of adherence to the judgment from the object to another 
subject directs the conversation to an aesthetic community and the communicability of 
beauty. This investigation only offered a depiction of individual existence of 
Lebensgelassenheit; however, community after the ‘new beginning’ was hinted at as 
playing an important role in its grounding. In subsequent projects relating to the issue of 
human value after Gelassenheit, it would be fruitful to work out how community might 
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exist beyond the technological will, a community of, to use Dennis Schmidt’s 
terminology, ‘lyrical and ethical’ subjects.* 
These further areas of investigation show that the topic I have discussed is 
conceptually interesting and relevant to contemporary work on both Kant and 
Heidegger.  Working with Lebensgelassenheit in terms of an aesthetic community of 
lively humans interested in life and capable of letting things show themselves in their 
emergence may provide another dimension of this idea that bridges into Kant’s social-
political writings, his work on history, and further into his practical philosophy. For 
now, however, we have a sketch of humanity as aware of their place within living 
nature, stirred by the pleasure of life’s fullness, and capable of playful interaction at the 
site of disclosiveness. This activity of the Ur-will with the things themselves indicates a 
harmonious accord between human and world that was forgotten in the modern 
worldview. It is through this activity of essential human willing that humanity finds 
what both Heidegger and Kant sought to find at the end of their philosophic projects, an 
exclusively human place in nature and a homecoming to that place where we can dwell 
as humans in the world.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  From	  Dennis	  Schmidt,	  Lyrical and Ethical Subjects, Albany: SUNY Press, 2005. 
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